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ABSTRACT 
 
Plato’s Gorgias: Rhetoric, the Greatest Evil, and  
the True Art of Politics 
 
by 
 
Paul A. George 
 
Dr. Mark Lutz, Examination Committee Chair 
Assistant Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
 The interweaving of rhetoric, the greatest evil, and the true art of politics create 
the unity of the dialogue.  Whereas Gorgianic rhetoric is pleasure seeking flattery which 
inspires belief without knowledge, noble rhetoric is refutative, inspiring the 
acknowledgment of falsity or ignorance.  Moreover, it is self-refutation, meaning that the 
person being persuaded arrives at the conclusion of his ignorance by his own realization; 
the noble rhetor does not connect all the dots for them.  The greatest evil is to have a false 
opinion about justice.  A just penalty for suffering from the greatest evil is to face self-
refutation in hopes that this will inspire a desire to seek true knowledge through 
philosophical inquiry.  The true art of politics is a personal, individual art, coordinating 
justice and legislation.  Justice teaches what the best care for the soul is and legislation 
regulates behavior to conform action with the demands of justice, being guided by self-
discipline and moderation.  Each participant in the dialogue suffers to a degree from the 
greatest evil, which Socrates addresses by conversing rhetorically with them to arouse an 
understanding of what rhetoric is, what their false opinions are, and how that relates to 
living the best life. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Plato’s Gorgias has a strange magic to it.  The dialogue is named after the famed 
rhetorician from Sicily, Gorgias of Leontini, who claimed to possess a kind of “verbal 
magic”: the art of rhetoric.  This he described as “the incantatory power which by its 
witchery enchants, persuades, and changes the souls of men” (Dodds 1959, 8).  That the 
Gorgias is concerned with this “magical” art is clear when early on Socrates states his 
intention to meet the rhetor in order to “learn from him what the power of his art is, and 
what it is that he professes and teaches” (447c).  The discussion that follows, however, 
deals with more than just rhetoric.  It probes into a plentitude of subjects including 
justice, punishment, pleasure, politics, and philosophy, often causing this original topic to 
be overshadowed.     The dialogue delves into the depths of the souls of the discussants, 
challenging them on their beliefs, desires, and ways of life. 
 But the direction of the dialogue does not produce a parallel change in all the 
souls of the participants, nor in those of its readers.  Where the dialogue proves 
persuasive for some, it is problematic for others.  While some of the commentators point 
to the power of Plato to “attract and enchant” those looking for “a richer and truer 
account of human life,” others see mostly “dark and gloom that awaits” (Stauffer 2006, 1; 
Arieti 1991, 79).  What is to account for the discrepancy between these descriptions?  
Answers to this question are varied and widespread, but are centered on the 
unique characteristics of the dialogue, such as its tone.  In comparison to the rest of 
Plato’s works the Gorgias arouses a unique bitterness, both from the philosopher and his 
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participants.  This bitterness is often seen as an indictment of rhetoric and democracy.  
Kennedy, ascribing the bitterness in the work to the death of Socrates, claims that Plato 
“is so prejudiced that he weights the scales against rhetoric” (1964, 15).  Hunt, blaming 
Plato’s dislike of Athenian politics, describes the apparent harsh treatment of rhetoric as a 
“broadly satirical caricature…(of) false pretense to knowledge, overweening conceit, 
fallacious argument…and, in general, a ready substitution of appearance for reality” 
(1925, 20). 
This view of Plato, however, is shortsighted.  The existence of things like logical 
flaws, historical liberties, and excessive bitterness might show something akin to motive 
to lambast rhetoric or democracy, but the evidence for intent is lacking.  Rather, the 
author’s intent can be found by turning to the most overlooked aspect of the dialogue: the 
drama. 
The dialogue format is not a treatise.  It is not meant to be a systematic, scientific 
analysis attempting to uncover and exhaust all aspects of a topic.  It is a conversation 
between individuals meant more to bring out what those individuals think, feel, and 
understand.  As a conversation, a dialogue involves action, or in other words, it involves 
drama.  The emphasis, the tone, the body language, and everything else that fills out a 
thought and completes what is being said are crucial parts of the work but have to be 
understood without explicit direction, as there is none given by the author.  Those in 
Plato’s day might have relied on their own knowledge of the historical characters to fill in 
these dramatic blanks, but we can still be assured today that someone who “curried and 
combed the locks of his dialogues to the end of his days” has left enough indirect cueing 
to bring us to his desired understanding of the work (Black 1958, 361).  A careful reading 
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will show there exists a depth, eloquence, and respect given by Plato to the characters 
that breathes truth.  It is thus becoming of the reader to give scrutinization to the work on 
par with the care put into it, which includes acknowledging that apparent fallacies were 
also apparent to the author and perhaps purposely so. 
 Ultimately, the intent of all of Plato’s dialogues is to show us the life of Socrates 
and bring us to a life of philosophy.  Often the most important part of such a philosophic 
education is to understand the obstacles in that path.  As Bruell notes, “the most 
important obstacles, which stem from the intrinsic difficulty of the problems treated by 
Plato, would have been encountered by readers of any period, including Plato’s own; and 
we can assume that he has supplied in the dialogues themselves the most suitable 
assistance for overcoming them” (1995, 96).  The problems of the dialogue thus prove to 
demonstrate the internal inconsistencies of the dialogue’s participants, perhaps the same 
ones that are in us as well.  In turn, the dialogues are not meant to prove beyond a shadow 
of a doubt the tenets it supports, but to show how characters themselves stand in relation 
to that tenet.  The argumentation is meant to draw them to reflect inwardly about their 
own opinions.  Attention to the drama of the dialogue brings out this understanding.   
Often Plato will use another character to point out the inconsistencies or faulty 
logic used elsewhere as another sign of the time and care put into the dialogues, showing 
the ultimate end of the work is a philosophical inquiry.  Moreover, it is a careful reader 
that will notice the inconsistencies that go unmentioned by others in the dialogue and to 
question those.  It is in this way that the inner reflection the dialogue prompts in the 
participants serves as a signal to the reader to ponder the same points.  This is the magic 
of the Gorgias; this is how the dialogue works its witchery. 
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 The question to ask is what problems, points, or obstacles to philosophy does the 
Gorgias wish its readers to ponder?  The subject of rhetoric has to be at least one of them.  
The dialogue begins as an inquiry into rhetoric with the father of the art.  In the 
subsequent jumble of interruptions that follows, the topic of rhetoric seems to be 
swallowed up by a number of different subjects.  But toward the end of the dialogue the 
topic again takes the forefront, though with new treatment.  Whereas in the beginning it 
merited a harsh critique as a base thing that promotes pleasure, in the end it reveals noble 
potential (503a).   
 The notion of a noble rhetoric, in fact, has seeds planted throughout the dialogue, 
even before the art receives its acrid assailment, and what these seeds point toward is 
possibly an alliance between rhetoric and dialectic.  Dialectic is a type of conversation, 
but is more of an inquiry, within a small group.  Views are presented, refutations then 
offered, and a common ground is arrived at, upon which the process begins again.  The 
process is able to proceed because the goal is truth, not victory over the other participant.  
But as Vlastos points out, Socrates typically has two ends for his dialectical debates: 
“how every human ought to live and to test the single human being that is doing the 
answering” (1983, 115).  It is this latter aspect that often ignites anger from the 
participants.  Additionally, the argument rarely ends with the discovery of truth, but 
instead produces aporia.  Rather than being brought to know something, the participants 
are more often left to realize that they do not know.  This awakening of ignorance also 
results in anger. 
How might rhetoric be used to supplement dialectic?  For dialectic to work, two 
characteristics, derived from the description above, are needed: a desire to search for the 
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truth and openness to recognize ignorance.  Rhetoric may be able to fill in these gaps. 
Rhetoric may be the supplement needed to persuade those otherwise closed off to 
philosophy to partake.  Rhetoric is like medication, indeed, a bitter pill, to cure the 
sickness of confusion, apathy, dislike, or hatred toward philosophy. 
Although Gorgias plays only a small part as the direct speaker in the dialogue, the 
whole work is really a conversation with the rhetor.  Gorgias does not remain silent after 
his beginning section ends, but he intercedes at crucial parts of the dialogue to keep it 
from breaking up.  Moreover, his interjections show that he is sincere and interested in 
what Socrates has to say, as if he is beginning to understand what an alliance between the 
two could mean.  Perhaps Socrates has some hope of a Gorgianic style of rhetoric that 
could reach the masses and the closed off in ways he couldn’t to turn them toward 
philosophy. 
While this fits the character, content, and drama of the dialogue, I feel there is still 
a greater lesson to learn.  The dialogue is not only a conversation between the characters, 
but also literature, and thus a conversation between the author and the reader.  Plato’s 
intent would then not be to make sure the reader has a proper understanding of the 
relationship between rhetoric and dialectic simply, but to bring him to philosophy.  In that 
sense, the dialogue acts as a piece of rhetoric itself, perhaps turning into propaganda for 
the Academy (Nichols 1995).  Also, the question of what obstacles kept the others in the 
dialogue from becoming philosophical has not been answered.  The greater lesson from 
the dialogue is a deeper understanding of the specific obstacles faced by the participants. 
In some way or other, Socrates accuses each of the discussants of not being in 
agreement with themselves.  Upon the notice of the first such inconsistency in the 
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dialogue, Socrates takes his time to explain that his purpose is not to refute in order to 
achieve verbal victory but to find the truth (457d-458b).  He then emphasizes this by 
stating that he believes “that nothing is so great an evil for a human being as a false 
opinion about the things that our argument now happens to be about”.  The subject matter 
then before them happens to be the power of rhetoric, or more particularly, the just use of 
that power.  Socrates’s reference to the greatest evil for a human being is more than 
simply a false opinion about the just use of rhetoric, but a false opinion about the nature 
of justice.   
 The tyrannical talk of the rest of the dialogue overshadows discussion of the 
greatest evil as having a false opinion.  Later on Socrates will repeat the label of the 
greatest evil but ascribe it to unjust acts instead of false opinions about justice (469d, 
479d).  To differentiate between having wrong beliefs about justice and committing 
unjust acts may seem an unnecessary differentiation, but the drama of the dialogue 
reveals that, at least for the three participants, having the false opinion is the greater 
harm.  Hobbes seemed to recognize this distinction and word it accurately when he wrote, 
"The actions of men proceed from their opinions; and in the well-governing of opinions, 
consisteth the well-governing of men's actions, in order to their peace and concord" 
(Hobbes 1996, 118).  While the participants, as well as many today, would insert the 
word "interests,” or perhaps "passions,” where "opinions" appears, Hobbes's position is 
clear: opinions are the primary factor behind action, and the root of the greatest evil 
(Grant 2002). 
 To be under the persuasion of false opinions, particularly false opinions about 
justice, is the obstacle to a philosophic life that Plato presents in the Gorgias.  Each 
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speaker presents the obstacle in a unique way, to which Socrates responds accordingly.  
The adherence that they give to their false opinions, the extent to which they hold to these 
tenets, keeps them from arguing dialectically.  This causes Socrates to speak rhetorically 
throughout the dialogue, which accounts for faulty arguments and bitter tone.  Were they 
able to participate in a dialectical conversation then this dialogue would look more like 
the Republic and delve into the nature of justice.  In fact, just as the Gorgias begins to 
touch upon the nature of justice the direction of the discussion swings away in order to 
face these dialectical obstacles first.  What the dialogue reveals as these obstacles are 
uncovered is not only an understanding of how to begin to pursue a philosophic life, but 
also important implications for leadership, education, and politics as a whole. 
 The next three chapters that follow will be devoted to each of the participants 
from the dialogue.  The arguments will be analyzed, with special attention paid to the 
drama, to understand the obstacle before the participant, his false opinion of justice, and 
what Plato is trying to suggest about it.  Concluding the paper will be a summary of the 
arguments and a possible suggestion for their application today.  The primary edition of 
the Gorgias used for this work is Nichols’s translation (1998).  All quotations to the text, 
unless otherwise noted, are his translation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
GORGIAS 
 Gorgias was from the Greek colony of Leontini, of the island of Sicily. He lived 
roughly from 485- 380 BCE.  Most of what remains of his past is largely that of rumor 
and anecdote with few firm facts to rely upon.  The surviving, reliable sources attest to 
the effectiveness and persuasiveness of Gorgias’s rhetoric, showing “that he was widely 
admired, that his popularity never waned during his life, and that he was wealthy and 
famous beyond all the other sophists” (Connors 1986, 46).  The rhetor spent his days 
travelling through Greece, unwed and childless, teaching his craft.  He is said to have 
taught Isocrates and Pericles and to have had an influence upon Thucydides; additionally, 
his ideas were predecessors for such modern-day thinkers as Heidegger, Derrida, and 
Rorty (Consigny 2001, 2).   
 What was it about this speaker, whose use of rhetoric “set the tone for the last 
thirty years of the fifth century,” that made him so attractive (Jaeger 1943, 127)?  His 
novelty in style set him apart, which included both a new sense of structure and 
ornamentation.  His work was innovatively poetic, using such literary devices as 
antithesis, anadiplosis (repetition of words), homoeoteleuton (similarity in ending 
syllables) and parisosis (arrangement of words in nearly equal periods) (Consigny 1992, 
43).  For Gorgias, logos with meter is poetry and logos without meter is rhetoric (a 
comment that does not go unnoticed by Plato in his dialogue) (McComisky 2002, 30).  
While his stylistic beauty won him praise, it also spurred heavy criticism.  The most 
forceful criticism comes from Aristotle, who calls his work “derivative,” “frigid,” and 
“overly theatrical,” which held as the prevailing attitude toward the rhetor until recent 
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times when both Hegel and Grote began  their attempt to “rehabilitate” the sophists 
(Consigny 2001, 69). 
Their “rehabilitation” brought about an emphasis on the substance of his work, 
which is the other attractive aspect that brought Gorgias recognition in his day. His 
novelty in content set him apart, particularly his use of paradoxologia, earning him the 
title of the father of the sophists.  While critics find his examples of paradox artistic but 
empty, others see in them a “practical validity” that points toward a certain epistemology, 
guided by a principle of kairos (McComisky 2002, 18).  This principle of an “opportune 
moment” creates a relativistic conception of truth, requiring a “continuous adjustment to 
and creation of the present occasion,” of which logos interprets (White 1987, 15).  This is 
seen in his work Encomium of Helen where the rhetor states:  
If all people on all subjects had memory of things past and comprehension of 
things present and prescience of things to come, then language [logos] would not 
function as it does [that is, as an imprecise medium]’ however, the way things are, 
it is difficult to remember the past and perceive the present and foretell the future, 
so that most people regarding most subjects accept opinion as advisor to their 
soul. (Van Hook, 1993, 123)  
Still, a reliance on the principle of kairos may be too little to rest a full philosophy 
upon.  With an insufficient amount of the rhetor’s work is extant, Consigny decided to 
compare what remains with other works within their relative genre rather than compare 
Gorgias’s works side by side.  What emerged, rather than a “theoretical consistency, “is a 
chameleon like Gorgias, able to shift, change, and adapt to relative audiences” (Consigny 
1992, 46).  While this imitative aspect may reinforce the idea of a relativistic 
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epistemology, there are several other aspects of his writings that cast a shadow on 
Gorgias having a firm philosophical stance.  The concluding line of the Helen reads, “I 
wished to write a speech which would be a praise of Helen and a diversion to myself 
“(Van Hook 1993, 123, emphasis added)   
There are many unanswered questions about Gorgias, prominent among them is 
whether he is serious or joking.  His most paradoxical work, On What Is Not, is 
considered by many to be a parody of Parmenides’s work On What Is.  Others believe 
that the other remaining works are models for instructing pupils (Poulakos 1983, 3).  The 
last line of the Helen certainly raises questions about his true intent.  While these 
unanswered points are important to ponder, another more pertinent question about the 
rhetor remains: why was Plato interested in him?   
The thesis of this paper is that the greatest evil to afflict a human being is to have 
a false opinion about justice.  The conversation with Gorgias, which forms only a short 
part of the whole dialogue, is quickly steered toward the topic of justice.  Some argue that 
the historical Gorgias would never have conceded to the premises of rhetoric and justice 
in the dialogue thereby making the arguments invalid (McComisky 2002, 31).  But 
whether Plato was completely true to the historical character or not is largely beside the 
point.  What proponents of the historical Gorgias cannot dismiss is the rhetor’s claim to 
not teach virtue, an aspect of his character that set him apart from the rest of the sophists, 
and the aspect that in all likelihood is the impetus for Plato’s interest (Harrison 1964, 
188).   
So how does his denial of teaching virtue relate to a false opinion about justice?  
To understand this there must first be mention of how the term was used in fifth-century 
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Greece.  Irwin, in his commentary on the dialogue, gives a good understanding of the 
term: 
Arētē, normally translated by virtue or excellence, refers quite generally to 
whatever properties make a thing good, agathon, at something or for some 
purpose…Gorgias denies that he teaches virtue because, unlike Protagoras, he 
does not claim to teach the recognized virtues which will make someone an all-
round good citizen.  But he can claim to teach a virtue, since he claims that the 
power gained by being a rhetor is a good for the rhetor himself. (1979, 122) 
Harrison agrees with Irwin’s conclusion and is quick to dismiss Gorgias’s denial of 
teaching virtue as “lacking any real substance” (1964, 189).  In his opening lines in the 
dialogue, Gorgias not only declares that he is a rhetor, but “a good one, if you wish to call 
me what I boast I am” (449a).  This is followed by his assertion that he is able to make 
other men rhetors as well.  Surely these claims together are not a promise to make his 
pupils bad at rhetoric; his promise is to make them able men of the art, to give them 
“freedom for human beings themselves and at the same time rule over others in each 
man’s city” (452d).  Clearly he teaches virtue as ability. 
 But Irwin defined Gorgias’s denial to teach virtue as a denial to make his pupils 
good citizens.  This sets Gorgias apart from the other sophists found throughout the 
Platonic corpus.  In fact, Plato is consistent in giving Gorgias preferential treatment in the 
dialogues over other sophists.  The conversation between Socrates and Gorgias is not a 
sarcastic, humoristic one like in the Hippias Major, nor is it a quasi-competition as in the 
Protagoras, but it is a cautious discussion that does more to pique the rhetor’s intrigue 
rather than anger or humiliate him.  His role as a money-maker for selling his craft earns 
  
12
him a spot with others sophists elsewhere in the dialogues (Apology 19d, Hippias Major 
282B).  But more remarkable is his absence from the gathering of sophists in the 
Protagoras and his own self labeling as “rhetor” rather than sophist in this dialogue (Pro. 
314e-316b, Gor. 449a).  There is an important difference between Gorgias and the rest 
that Plato wants discerned. 
What the sophists meant by teaching virtue, as seen in the Protagoras, is a very 
similar to the education just outlined by Gorgias: a promise of “success in political debate 
and action” (319a).  Socrates sums up this education as “art of citizenry” (319a).  
Gorgias, on the other hand, seeks only to define his art in terms of persuasion (453a, 
454b, 455a).  This persuasion focuses on political aspects (being in a law court, gaining 
rule over others, etc.) but Gorgias never calls it an art of politics or citizenry.  First and 
foremost it is an art of persuasion.   
What does this show about Gorgias’s opinion about the art?  Perhaps it shows a 
deeper care, or a greater passion, than what the other sophists have.  While both his initial 
claim to be a good rhetor and his finale in the Helen might be seen as arrogance they can 
also be a demonstration of his care for the craft.  He takes it seriously, while enjoying it 
immensely.  Neither is he when he states that his art is the best and greatest, nor is he 
simply pandering to potential pupils; he truly believes there is a greatness in the art that 
surpasses all others.  He does what he does because he cannot help himself, which 
relegates money-making to a secondary concern.  It is hard to say where money-making 
ranks for the sophists in the other dialogues.  A greater care for the art (perhaps a greater 
eros) and less care for money-making account for Plato’s preferential treatment of 
Gorgias.     
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How does this relate to Gorgias’s denial to teach virtue?  It is because his main 
goal is not educating but practicing his art, perhaps something not too uncommon with 
some professors in academia today who are more interested in research than in shaping 
young minds.  So the important thing to understand about his denial of teaching virtue is 
realizing he has little care for it. The relativistic nature of logos makes an idea of virtue, 
or good citizenry, superfluous or irrelevant. He can be considered agnostic on the 
question of virtue, which allows him to define his art as amoral. 
Plato, on the other hand, understands virtue in the morally laden sense that is 
more typical of its use today.  This is crucial to understanding the thesis of the dialogue.  
Plato believes that despite Greek culture’s understanding of virtue as good by effective 
use, there is an inner understanding in all of us that concurs with understanding virtue as 
good for the soul.  McKim calls this the “Socratic Axiom,” which states: “for Socrates, 
virtue is always supremely beneficial to the moral agent himself as well as to those 
toward whom he acts virtuously, whereas vice, in addition to the material harm it inflicts 
on others, is always supremely harmful to the agent, being bad for the health of his soul” 
(1988, 35).  Part of Socrates’s intent in questioning Gorgias is to bring him to realize that 
he too believes this axiom, and that his ambivalence toward virtue is itself unjust. 
Following the drama of the dialogue closely will show the rhetor’s stance toward 
virtue, which will be revealed by uncovering Gorgias’s false opinions about justice.  To 
do this Socrates will have to question the rhetor in his usual way, which requires putting 
aside Gorgias’s show rhetoric and following a course of conversation instead (447c).  
Gorgias, having just made an offer to answer any question posed to him, gladly agrees to 
answer Socrates, expecting it to be a demonstration of his skill (449c). 
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The first question posed asks for a definition of rhetoric which does not come 
easily.  In compliance with Socrates’s request to give brief answers, Gorgias first 
concludes that rhetoric is about speeches (449e).  But this is too vague; medicine, 
arithmetic, and even gymnastic all require speech.  What are rhetorical speeches about 
that makes them different?  Still not getting to the point, Gorgias tries to differentiate 
between arts that use manual skill and those that do not.  Rhetoric produces its “whole 
action and decisive effect” without manual input (450c).  After a third request for 
clarification, the rhetor draws the conclusion that rhetoric is speeches about “the greatest 
of human affairs, and the best” (451d).  But does not the doctor claim health is the best 
thing for humans, and the trainer claims beauty is, and the moneymaker wealth? 
With a little more prodding Gorgias arrives at almost a clear answer: rhetoric, 
with its decisive effect through speech, causes “freedom for human beings…and rule 
over others in each man’s own city” which includes persuading judges, assemblymen, 
councilors, and any type of man in every “political gathering” (452d-453a).  Socrates 
sums this up succinctly: rhetoric is the craftsman of persuasion.  Gorgias is happy with 
this answer; what makes this answer pleasing to him is that persuasion is the “chief 
point” (453a).  Through speech, Gorgias has been able to persuade the politically 
powerful, which he did in 427 BCE as an ambassador sent to Athens to ask for assistance 
against Syracuse.  He has also been able to persuade many into becoming his pupils by 
having them believe he has value to impart to them.  But perhaps most important, he has 
been able to persuade himself that his art is good and valuable.  
Socrates takes an approach that addresses these three areas: persuading the 
politically powerful, the potential pupil, and one’s self.  Working in reverse order, the 
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philosopher gives an example of how he persuades himself.  Self-persuasion, as the 
dialogue will show, is ultimately what rhetoric, or better stated noble rhetoric, is about.  
This first inkling toward a noble purpose or use for rhetoric will grow from this quiet 
interjection to a harsh refutation by the end of the dialogue, culminating in a new outlook 
for politics and philosophy.   
Socrates’s own use of self-persuasion is to ascertain the bottom-line truth of any 
argument (453b).  This shows Socrates’s openness to discussion and his desire to know, 
placing knowledge higher than verbal victory on a hierarchy of importance.  What 
matters is the truth that comes from the argument.  This is in contrast to Gorgias’s use of 
self-persuasion, which had been to instill a deep care for rhetoric above anything else, 
including justice.  What matters to him is the ability to craft the argument in any way 
desired through logos.   
This mention of self-persuasion is preparation for a refutation of Gorgias’s false 
opinion on justice.  While dialectic was Plato's general scientific method, rhetoric is a 
special psychological application of it (Black 1958, 369).  Noble rhetoric’s purpose is 
refutation, primarily to refute or persuade ourselves against our own false opinions.  
Socrates takes extra care at this point to show his sincerity toward the argument, not 
toward verbal victory.  This is the first of many coddlings that Socrates will offer the 
rhetor to ensure Gorgias does not become personally offended and therefore sticks with 
the argument.  As will be seen, these codlings will work, for, unlike the other participants 
in the dialogue, Gorgias will remain an active, though mostly silent, participant.   
Next Socrates has Gorgias focus on his ability to persuade potential pupils by 
asking whether any other art persuades.  Socrates gives teaching as an example and 
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Gorgias replies in the affirmative, acknowledging that instructive arts also persuade 
(453d).  Just as other arts also use speeches, clarification is sought here by asking about 
what is rhetoric persuasive?  The answer reveals an unforeseen, or better yet, neglected 
aspect of Gorgias’s role as a teacher.  The rhetor replies that it is persuasion in the law 
courts, “about the just and the unjust” (454b).   
This is an important turn in the drama.  Just raised is an issue that connects virtue 
and rhetoric, so how can Gorgias claim not to teach virtue when his whole art revolves 
around a part of virtue, being the just and the unjust?  This admission that rhetoric is 
about the just and unjust may not be a completely sincere answer.  Levett believes this 
simply refers “to a common-sense, general knowledge of laws, customs, values and even 
the procedures that pertain in such circumstances” (2005, 212).  This is an emphasis on 
place rather than value.  Nichols notes that it is more an advertisement to the potential 
students listening by forcing Gorgias to leave behind a universal art of persuasiveness 
and instead focus on the rhetorical area most in demand, “politics in general and judicial 
proceedings in particular” (1998, 132-133).   Alternatively, Kahn offers that in, order to 
protect himself from expulsion from the city, Gorgias, a foreigner to Athens, has to keep 
hidden both his ambivalence toward virtue and the unjust nature of rhetoric to avoid 
“suspicion and hostility” from the families of the youth that surround him (1983, 80-81).   
Socrates, however, is concerned with having Gorgias come face to face with his 
false opinion about justice.  This point, though, is not yet apparent to Gorgias.  It not 
likely that Gorgias is thinking of virtue in the same manner as Socrates, nor is it likely 
that Gorgias is connecting virtue to justice at this point.  To ensure that Gorgias does not 
begin to think Socrates is trying to corner him into harm or embarrassment, Socrates 
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offers another coddling, again confirming the conclusion of the argument as the most 
important thing (454b-c).   
The focus is now on the third example of rhetorical persuasion, the politically 
powerful.  Socrates eases into addressing the political aspect by first focusing on 
persuasion.  Two types exist, that which teaches and that which inspires belief.  When 
asked which type of persuasion rhetoric engenders Gorgias answers, “it’s clear, I suppose 
Socrates, that it’s the one from which believing comes” (454e).  If the answer is clear, 
why does Gorgias add “I suppose,” thereby adding a touch of hesitation to his response?  
It is because he can see where this admission can lead and he is beginning to wonder 
whether Socrates is true to his consoling sidebars to put the argument over verbal victory.  
From this concession Socrates clarifies a new definition of rhetoric, stating it as “a 
craftsman of belief-inspiring but not didactic persuasion about the just and the unjust” 
(455a). 
Now comes the focus on the persuasion of the political.  Rhetoric is not didactic 
in the law courts due to two difficulties: a lack of time and the size of the audience.  Both 
Nichols and Irwin see this as a sizeable attack on rhetoric, suggesting that the non-
didactic nature shows a lack of concern with or a lack of knowledge about justice (1998, 
37; 1979, 119).  On the other hand, Stauffer sees no attack on rhetoric here, but counts 
this remark simply as an admission of the reality of political discourse and the necessity 
to speak both to the many and with little time, meaning that “the most effective political 
speech must include appeals to mere opinions and beliefs, having the necessary strength 
of instilling those very opinions or beliefs” (2006, 28).  Whether this is an attack or a 
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support, the next statement will be a golden invitation for Gorgias to extol the good of 
rhetoric. 
Suppose there is a situation where the city is in need of counsel, such as a 
pressing need to construct a dockyard.  Socrates suggests that the city will seek counsel 
from “the most artful,” which in the case of the dockyard construction would be the 
architect, not a rhetor (455b).  Prompting the opinion of Gorgias, the question is posed in 
chorus with the voices the potential students in attendance, “What will be ours Gorgias, if 
we associate with you?  About what things will we be able to give counsel to the city?” 
(455d).  
Gorgias is a clever man.  He recognizes that Socrates has shied away from turning 
negative toward rhetoric, stating that the philosopher has “paved the way beautifully” 
(455e). He has been given an opportunity to present his art in the best light possible.  
Perhaps this makes the rhetor believe that Socrates is really concerned with the argument 
itself.  It is not the craftsman who guides the city, but the rhetors, such as Pericles and 
Themistocles.  This is the power of the rhetor, to victoriously give counsel and have their 
resolutions win over the craftsmen (456a).   
Even as Socrates posed the question he already knew the answer.  Themistocles’s 
accomplishments of constructing the Athenian navy were well known and Socrates 
personally heard Pericles counsel for the construction of the middle wall.  Neither of the 
two was a craftsman for that which he counseled (455e).  This was a essentially a free 
throw for Gorgias.  This was a concession of the debate principle of charity: allowing the 
opponent the best position to defend their side.  This charity will be built upon and 
provide another free throw for Gorgias.  Socrates wonders at the power of rhetoric, 
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calling it “demonic in greatness,” which prompts Gorgias to deliver his longest speech in 
the dialogue as a praise of rhetoric. 
The power of rhetoric is to gather under itself all things, making it more 
persuasive than any craftsman (456c). Gorgias then relays an anecdote of an experience 
with his brother, Herodicus the physician.  The craftsman of health was unable to 
persuade a patient to submit to a treatment, but Gorgias, using only the power of rhetoric, 
was able to do so.  The power of rhetoric is power: the ability through persuasion to make 
others do, think, and believe anything.  Gorgias has finally answered the first part of 
Socrates’s initial inquiry.  
But then Gorgias takes a confusing turn; he begins a defense of rhetoric. Why 
offer a defense?  Was an accusation given?  Gorgias claims that, like any other 
competitive art, the trainer should not be blamed for the misuse of the art; just as a boxing 
trainer should not be blamed for a student who beats his parents, the rhetor should not be 
blamed for the unjust use of rhetoric.  Dodds suggests that this may have been an 
illustration from the historical Gorgias himself (1959, 212).  Rhetoric’s tendency toward 
injustice has been the anticipated point in the dialogue ever since Gorgias defined 
rhetoric as being about the just and unjust; however, it was anticipated that Socrates make 
this point instead of the rhetor. 
But still, why offer a defense?   Why not continue to praise the power of rhetoric 
and give more examples of how it is good?  Would not this do more to both please the 
crowd and answer Socrates’s inquiry?  There are two possible answers.  First, it is 
possible that Gorgias realizes that the good examples of rhetoric do not show the 
preeminence of the art but demonstrate its subservience to another art, such as how 
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rhetoric served medicine.  Rhetoric did not diagnose the medical problem, and persuading 
the patient to submit to the treatment does nothing to elevate rhetoric over medicine.  If 
the patient is cured it is the doctor, not the rhetor, who will be praised.  Additionally, it is 
more probable that Gorgias assisted at his brother’s request; there is no glory in rhetoric 
exerting itself over medicine.  In a similar manner, the examples of Themistocles and 
Pericles previously given also show how rhetoric was subservient to the greater interests 
of the common good of the state. 
Second, it is possible that he can think of no good example of the exercise of this 
power unless it reveals his ambivalence toward justice or an unjust exercise of the power.  
The best he can do is exculpate himself by claiming (insincerely) that rhetoric is taught 
justly, thereby placing the blame of unjust use on wayward students.  Gorgias has no guilt 
blaming students in this way because through his practice of rhetoric he never committed 
an overt act of injustice.  This raises an important point when talking about the unjust 
side of rhetoric: power.  Ranasinghe describes Gorgias’s desire for power well, “The 
sophists see human beings as so many frogs living around a Mediterranean Sea of words, 
but [Gorgias] does not seek to be the Frog-King’s speechwriter or a predatory Water 
Moccasin” (2009, 32).  Unlike the other participants in the dialogue, Gorgias has little or 
no desire for power, which is why he can remain amoral toward justice and virtue. The 
greater desire for power by the other participants will force them to adopt an immoral 
stance. 
Realizing that Gorgias anticipates an embarrassing attack upon rhetoric or 
himself, Socrates slows down to coddle the rhetor again.  Dodds notes that “Plato was 
always careful to distinguish Socratic dialectic, which aims only at the attainment of 
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truth, from its vulgar counterfeit, the ‘eristic’ or ‘antilogic,’ which aims at personal 
victory” (1959, 213).  The coddling here, however, is more to prepare the rhetor for the 
next potential knock to rhetoric rather than reassure him of the argument’s importance 
over verbal victory.  Socrates is about to reveal the greatest evil. 
The coddling at this part emphasizes that Socrates is happier to be refuted than to 
refute because it is “the greater good to be released oneself from the greatest evil…For I 
think that nothing is so great an evil for a human being as false opinion about the things 
that our argument now happens to be about” (458a-b).  The argument currently is about 
the just use of rhetoric.  A false opinion about the just use of rhetoric is a false opinion 
about justice itself, which is the greatest evil.   
Several reasons show why this has been an overlooked aspect in the Gorgias.  
One is that the definition of the greatest evil gets confused during the dialogue.  Two 
other places where Socrates speaks of the greatest evil show it as doing injustice, and 
doing injustice without suffering the just penalty (469b, 479d).  While these bear 
similarities to one another, the difference between them boils down to thought versus 
action.  Which is worse, thinking or committing an unjust act?  Even though committing 
an unjust act in ignorance might make thought the more heinous part, most seem to side 
with the commission.  But referring again to the point made by Hobbes, actions proceed 
from opinion, or thought.  Additionally, the drama of the dialogue will show that false 
opinion is the greater concern for the participants as no one truly has the stomach to 
actually commit such unjust deeds as they extol.   
A second reason why false opinion is the greatest evil is overlooked is simply 
that, it gets overlooked.  The topics of discussion in the dialogue bounce around with 
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great variety.  The question about rhetoric turns into a discussion on flattery, then 
tyranny, followed by punishment, shame, justice, philosophy, politics, pleasure, good, 
happiness, injury, courage, and death.  With so many topics receiving attention, this 
sentence gets only passing mention by commentators, like Olympiodorus, who simply 
emphasizes that a false opinion about a great matter leads to great harm (1998, 107).  
Dodds also gives it passing mention, recognizing that “something more fundamental (is 
at stake), a whole weltanschauungg,” relating it to two other references about man’s 
happiness at 472c and 500c (1959, 215), but fails to make a larger connection to anything 
else in the dialogue.  Closer attention to these passages about happiness make clear the 
importance of having a correct opinion about justice in order to obtain happiness. 
A third and final reason why the greatest evil being a false opinion of justice is 
overlooked is that Socrates appears to not be able to persuade anyone in the dialogue.  
Toward the end of each section, there are no firm statements of agreement with Socrates 
from the discussants, but ambivalent declarations that Socrates is able to make everything 
harmonize (460e, 480e, 513c).   This causes a focus more on Socrates’s technique rather 
than substance, which is revealed to be rhetorical, making rhetoric the sole central theme 
of the dialogue rather than a triumvirate of rhetoric, the greatest evil, and politics.  But 
overlooked link between these themes is that the self-persuasion of noble rhetoric is self-
refutation, to confront and deny our own beliefs in order to correct and adhere to a true 
understanding of justice. 
A sign of having a false opinion is internal dissonance.  The Socratic axiom states 
that everyone has the correct, moral understanding of virtue, but for some reason or other 
a false opinion takes supremacy.  In the lengthy coddling that revealed the greatest evil, 
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Socrates notes such a dissonance in Gorgias, claiming that he is “saying things not quite 
consequent or consistent with what you were saying at first about rhetoric” (457e).  This 
is a polite way of bringing up his dissonance, consistent with the rest of the coddling 
paragraph.  
 Socrates spells out this dissonance a little later, swearing “by the dog” that 
understanding this is no small matter (461b).  The use of the oath “by the dog” turns into 
a dramatic element that signals when Socrates is addressing the participants’ internal lack 
of harmony.  Later on, Socrates will expand this oath to “by the dog, god of the 
Egyptians!” (482b).  The significance of this is described by Blackwood, Crossett, and 
Long.  The dog-like god of the Egyptians was Anubis, who, at the doors to the 
underworld, would weigh the heart of the recently deceased in order to measure truth and 
deception.  The weighing of the heart would consist in a “negative confession,” wherein 
the dead would make such statements as “I have not done iniquity” and “I have not 
uttered falsehood” (Blackwood et al 1962, 318).  Only the truthful were allowed to pass.  
Socrates, in a similar manner, thus weighs the hearts of his participants against the 
Socratic standard of virtue and swears the oath when a falsehood is spoken or otherwise 
uncovered. 
Rather than pursue his lack of harmony, Gorgias tries to excuse himself from the 
argument by stating that the crowd must be tired from listening to him for so long.  The 
crowd, however, gives an uproar of approval to hear the conversation to its end.  
Ashamed to not live up to his offer to answer any question put to him, he reluctantly 
continues.  His reluctance to further pursue his inconsistency openly is centered upon his 
devotion to his art.  He is convinced that rhetoric is a good thing despite the bad face it is 
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putting on.  He probably believes this because he is so good at it.  Being good at it makes 
him feel good and therefore it must be good.  But at the same time he cannot name why it 
is good.  He has demonstrated that it is power, but can offer no just example of the art 
without diminishing its power with the taint of injustice.  Socrates will attempt to show 
Gorgias that his ambivalence to virtue is what is keeping him from naming what is good 
about rhetoric.  In order to do that, Gorgias will have to give real consideration to justice, 
a necessary step to overcome his false opinion. 
The argument then shows that the rhetor is more persuasive only to the ignorant.  
A group of experts would not be persuaded by his seeming knowledge.  The whole 
system of rhetoric is simply to “discover a certain device of persuasion” to appear to 
know (459a-c).  This is perhaps a worse blow to rhetoric than demonstrating its tendency 
toward injustice.  But allowing Gorgias to bring up the question of justice softens the 
reception of the this critique.  Gorgias can see the implication of this and again he tries to 
save it, not by offering what is good to counter what makes it look bad, but again trying 
to appeal to its power.  Just by learning this one art, still the rhetor “in no way gets the 
worse of it from the craftsman” (459c).  This seems to be a call for a judgment on the 
quality of rhetoric, but Socrates will withhold from stating whether it is good or not until 
another time, which will come in the discussion with Polus when the art itself is actually 
defined by the philosopher. 
Socrates wants Gorgias to stay focused on the issue of justice, so he asks the 
obvious question: if rhetoric is about the just and unjust, has the rhetor simply discovered 
a device to appear to know justice, or does he really know it?  Had he stopped here this 
would have been quite a damaging question for Gorgias to answer, but Socrates does 
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something interesting.  He changes the focus of the question and asks whether the student 
of rhetoric needs to know these things before coming to the teacher of rhetoric or can 
they be taught later.  Gorgias concedes that he would teach his students if they did not 
know.  Notice that this answer responds only to the second question about the students 
and does not directly answer the question about the teacher.  Implicit in the concession to 
the student question is an acknowledgement for the teacher to truly know justice, but this 
goes by with little attention called to it.  It is here, in this affirmative response by Gorgias, 
that Socrates has made his point: you cannot claim to be ambivalent about justice and 
virtue when your art is centered upon them, and your deep care for the art is really a deep 
care for justice.   
Nichols notes that Gorgias must be feeling two things at this point: intrigue and a 
puzzled gratitude (1998, 136).  The gratitude stems from being let off easy by not having 
to respond directly that the rhetor must be a knower of justice; the intrigue stems from the 
next set of questions.  Socrates presents a paradox: if someone who learns carpentry is 
called a carpenter, is the man who learns justice called a just man?  Moreover, as a 
carpenter performs carpentry, does the knower of just necessarily do just things (460b)?  
Paradox may have been a playful thing for Gorgias, but he sees no levity in what is 
presently before him 
The logical problems of the argument are obvious.  The substitution of a value for 
a profession in the analogy given is a not comparing apples to apples.  Additionally, there 
is no guarantee that the knower of justice will do only justice, never committing injustice.  
But this matter of justice is not the main point Socrates is trying to make.  His point has 
already been made to Gorgias: he cannot take justice and virtue so ambivalently.  The 
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conclusion of the argument turns the attention of the crowd away from Gorgias the man 
to rhetoric the art.  Gorgias wants to know why Socrates has not pressed the point against 
himself, and that is why he will remain as a small, but crucial, participant in the dialogue. 
Gorgias, the father of rhetoric and sophistic, was a novel writer to be sure.  But it 
was not his novelty in writing that attracted Socrates, but his sincerity for his art and his 
ambivalence to virtue.  His sincerity for his art will make him open to a discussion that 
will lead to a deeper discussion about justice and virtue.  If the dialogue were a polemic 
against rhetoric then Socrates passed up some very opportune moments to attack.  The 
purpose of the dialogue, however, is to combat the greatest evil, having a false opinion 
about justice.  Socrates is successful in getting Gorgias to open himself up to what he 
really thinks about justice and what the consequences of his beliefs mean for his art and 
his life.  He recognizes that Socrates is not out to harm him, both by the many cautious 
statements denying the desire for mere verbal victory and by actually passing up the 
many opportunities to humiliate the rhetor in front of a large crowd.  But to really push 
Gorgias over the edge to make him confront the consequences of his ambivalence toward 
justice, Socrates will have Gorgias see the fruit of his labor.  Perhaps because he was in 
so much demand Gorgias never stayed in any place long enough to see how his pupils 
would use the art he had taught them.  But now, one of his students will take over the 
discussion, forcing Gorgias to come to grips with what a promise of power without the 
restraints of virtue looks like. 
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CHAPTER 3 
POLUS 
Polus of Acgras, like his teacher Gorgias, is also from Sicily.  His name in Greek 
means “colt,” which suits his nature as he is young and brash, often careless as well.  He 
is an advanced student in rhetoric, having written a treatise on the subject that Socrates 
mentions at 462b, apparently familiar enough with it to quote it.  This makes Polus 
something like a published graduate student.  He is mentioned by Socrates in the 
Phaedrus and Aristotle in the Metaphysics also makes a short note about him.  Otherwise, 
little else is known about the historical person. 
What purpose does Polus have in the dialogue?  He is treated harshly in the 
literature, many noting how dim-witted he is and how badly he argues.  Most treat him as 
a simple stepping stone to get to the real meat of the dialogue: the Callicles section.  
These statements are true but miss the larger point.  Each successive participant opens the 
existing discussion a little further, brings out a little more of the bitterness in the work, 
and also goes in new directions.  The previous chapter ended with the thought that 
Gorgias needed to view what his art produced in order to turn away from his false 
opinions of justice and virtue.  But Polus himself will also present his own unique false 
opinions. 
So what false opinions does Polus have?  The drama of the dialogue reveals it.  
Polus first appears in the very beginning, before Gorgias utters a word.  Socrates asks his 
companion Chaerephon to ask the rhetor “who he is,” but it is Polus who impetuously 
jumps in to answer.  His justification for answering in place of his teacher is that he can 
answer as well as his teacher (448b).  His answers, however, prove no better than 
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Gorgias’s first responses.  Instead of offering a direct answer he delves into a detailed 
praise of the art, apparently quoting himself from his own work.  Because no praise or 
defense was called for, Socrates accuses Polus of practicing rhetoric, which is the first 
mention of the term in the dialogue (448d).   
Polus’s response to the accusation of not answering but practicing rhetoric is “did 
not I answer that it was the finest?” (448e).  This response is very telling.  This mistake of 
stating worth in lieu of a definition is a mistake all the participants will make, but perhaps 
Polus takes this correction a little personally.  Like his master, Polus has a deep care for 
rhetoric, but unlike his master, it is not a care for the art itself.  It is a care for what the art 
can get him: power and reputation.  Everything he does in the dialogue is to set himself 
up as a good rhetor, which takes the form of praising and protecting the art itself.  This 
will lead him to claim that the rhetor is like a tyrant, powerful enough to do anything he 
desires, such as beat, steal, and kill at will (466b).  This praise of injustice, however, is all 
show, for Polus has courage enough only to commit the injustice of being ungrateful 
toward his teacher by trying to establish himself as greater.  Socrates will thus go about 
combating this false opinion by eroding what Polus thinks is good about rhetoric and 
reputation. 
As noted, his initial interruption was to prove his rhetoric is as sufficient as that of 
his teacher.  His subsequent interruption that begins his long section in the dialogue is 
upon slightly different grounds, that he knows what Gorgias knows (462a).  These two 
things, being equal in style and knowledge, put him on par with his teacher, but what sets 
him above is that, unlike his teacher, he will not fall prey to shame.  It was shame that 
caused Gorgias to admit that he would teach the knowledge of the just to his students if 
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they did not know them (461b).  It was fear of the crowd, losing students, being deported, 
but mostly fear of defacing rhetoric that caused Gorgias to go along with Socrates.  
Unlike his master, Polus is courageous (or shameless) enough to fully speak his mind. 
Polus is correct that it was shame that caused Gorgias to admit that rhetoric is 
about the just and unjust, but it was not shame that caused him to fall silent toward the 
end.  Gorgias’s silence came from a sudden self-realization brought about by Plato’s 
paradox: can an art about the just and unjust not truly know or care about justice?  
Gorgias is beginning to think this is not possible.  The young colt jumps into the 
conversation so fast it is difficult to discern whether Gorgias would have continued the 
conversation.  His subsequent contributions to the dialogue suggest that he would have.   
The apparent shamelessness of Polus to speak his true mind on these things points 
toward his own false opinions about justice.  Much like his teacher, he has a sense of 
ambivalence toward the question of justice.  This stems mostly from a lack of intent to 
actually commit injustice, or at least overt acts of injustice.  The student, however, is 
more self-centered than the teacher, and desires from rhetoric not an art, but reputation.  
He truly is an example of the unjust student Gorgias outlined, which will make this part 
of the dialogue a pertinent example of what his craft, a practice that teaches the power of 
power without the restraints of morality, looks like.  In this way, the Polus section is a 
continued conversation with Gorgias as well as an attempt to address the false opinions of 
Polus.   
Polus’s lack of sincerity toward rhetoric will cause Socrates to refrain from the 
coddling he showed Gorgias.  His large ego will call for a harsher refutation than Gorgias 
needed.  As a result Socrates will begin to display the bitterness the dialogue is known 
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for.  But why is bitterness necessary?  Fussi describes it well when she writes, “we can 
understand why the Gorgias sounds so bitter to its readers. It is as bitter as the bitter 
drugs Socrates claims to be administering to his interlocutors. It is the work of a doctor, 
not that of a cook. It uses rhetorical devices, not to please us, but so that we may be 
willing to discard them” (2000, 54).  Gorgias’s anecdote of the doctor and the rhetorician 
becomes more pertinent now.  The cure for a false opinion about justice is in the 
understanding of the nature of justice, which is the work of the philosopher.  Socrates can 
offer them a cure, but it will be a doctor offering it to a stubborn patient who refuses to 
submit to treatment.  So rather than elaborate on the nature of justice, Socrates will play 
the role of the rhetor and use rhetoric to persuade them to refute their own false opinions.  
Since rhetoric is not a didactic art, Socrates will not be teaching about justice, but using a 
persuasive device to convince the participants that their own opinions are false.  As such, 
the arguments presented in the Polus section will contain several logic flaws; they are not 
perfect proofs about the tenets they uphold.  Rather than reveal absolute truth, they will 
reveal how Polus feels about justice, which is the first step toward self-refutation. 
The first difference in treatment tailored for Polus is that he is allowed to ask the 
questions.  This is unusual for a Platonic dialogue; Socrates typically serves as the 
questioner and rarely gives as frank an answer as he does here.  This, however, is mere 
placebo for Polus.  Though he thinks he is in control of the discussion, Socrates will 
blatantly direct Polus on which questions to ask and how to ask them, eventually 
assuming the reigns of questioning completely.  Right from the first question, which asks 
for a definition of rhetoric, Socrates redirects how the questioning proceeds.  Before 
asking what rhetoric is, Socrates states that what is needed first is to know whether it is 
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an art (462b).  It is no art, but rather an experience “in the production of a certain grace 
and pleasure” (462c).   
Not even attempting to understand what this means Polus asks if this definition 
does not mean that rhetoric is a fine thing.  Throughout, Polus will seek the 
commendation of rhetoric, which really serves his own aggrandizement.  Socrates, 
however, is afraid to give a fuller meaning of rhetoric in fear of offending Gorgias, who 
might think that Socrates is trying to attack him personally.  This further coddling of 
Gorgias, even when he is not the main participant in the dialogue, is the first proof that 
Socrates is not done conversing with the rhetor (Friedländer 1969, 253).  But Gorgias 
gives his assurance and encourages the philosopher to “speak without feeling ashamed 
before me” (463a).  What might be added to the end of that is “unlike how I was ashamed 
to speak before you,” a sign that the rhetor has begun to take the pill of self-refutation. 
Socrates’s initial inquiry of Gorgias was to discover the power of the art and to 
ascertain what the rhetor professes and teaches.  The former was discussed, the latter only 
slightly and indirectly.  But all along Socrates has had a “suspicion” of what Gorgias 
teaches.  Although Socrates offers his last coddling of Gorgias by suggesting that he is 
unsure that what he is about to say is “the same rhetoric that Gorgias pursues,” what is 
described seems to be exactly what the rhetor pursues and teaches (462e; Stauffer 2006, 
44). 
Rhetoric is a part of flattery.  It is not an art, but simply an experience, learned by 
someone good at guessing with sufficient cleverness and courage.  It belongs with the 
other experiences that shadow true arts: cookery, cosmetic, and sophistry.  Flattery thus 
consists of these four parts, and rhetoric is the part of flattery that is the phantom of 
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politics (463b-d).  Polus, however, is still not listening, for he immediately asks whether 
rhetoric is a fine thing or not.  Socrates responds no, it is not fine, but shameful.  At this 
point someone who is listening, Gorgias, interrupts and admits he does not comprehend, 
to which Socrates concurs that he has not said anything clear yet.  The conversation now 
takes an important dramatic turn and puts Gorgias back in the participant’s seat.  With an 
active, open participant, Socrates is able to pursue a more dialectical course and begins a 
didactic exposition of the nature of flattery, which will hint toward the nature of justice.  
This leads to the discussion of what Plochman and Robinson call “the Divided Oblong” 
(1988, 63-70).  There are other, more simple, diagrams that outline what Socrates 
explains here, but Plochman and Robinson correctly see that the structure created here 
creates “a context that will retain for the rest of the dialogue” (1988, 57). 
The name is derived from its similarity to the divided line in Book 6 of the 
Republic (509d-513e).  The subject matter of the divided line of the Republic is one-
dimensional, dealing with the nature of existence, the subject matter in the Gorgias is 
two-dimensional, extending the line into a rectangle, or oblong.  The oblong outlines the 
best care of both body and soul.  The example runs from 464b-466a, and goes as follows: 
there exist both body and soul and each has a particular business, or art, which governs it, 
looking toward what is best.  The business of the soul is politics; the business of the body 
Socrates is unable to name.  While the business of both body and soul is singular, each art 
branches into two parts, gymnastic and medicine for the body and the legislative art and 
justice for the soul.  Then came flattery, which by luck and experience discovered how to 
mimic these true arts, replacing the care of the best with folly and whatever is pleasant.  
In a geometrical fashion, the correlating flatteries align with the true arts as follows: “as 
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cosmetic is to gymnastic, so is sophistry to the legislative art; as cookery is to medicine, 
so is rhetoric to justice” (465c).   
There is a significant amount of work going on is this framework.  There is a 
juxtaposition of internal versus external.  It is easy to recognize the external nature of  the 
body compared to the internal soul, as well as the external beauty gymnastic creates and 
the internal health made by medicine.  But if this dichotomy is to be used throughout the 
framework, it becomes a little more difficult to understand legislation as external and 
justice as internal.  To complicate this, while the idea of a soul is intuitively internal, an 
understanding of politics is not.  More on this internal/external aspect will be discussed 
shortly. 
Also involved is a suggested, though not explicit stated, hierarchy of the arts.  
While the divisions within body and soul share similarities they also maintain distinct 
differences, though what these differences are goes unmentioned (464c).  Stauffer 
believes that the lack of differentiation suggests “the difference is between seeking the 
correction of an ill condition (medicine/justice) and the pursuit of further development 
beyond a basic state of health (gymnastic/legislation)” (2006, 46).  In other words, he 
puts the external factors as deserving a higher place than the internal ones.  Plochman and 
Robinson agree, and conclude that legislation and sophistic are the true arts of body and 
soul that Socrates is trying to emphasize (1988, 68). 
What leads Stauffer to make this assumption is an unspoken implication that this 
framework makes about justice: “namely, that justice serves merely to remedy a flawed 
situation” (2006, 46).  I disagree.  As Stauffer would outline it, the art of politics is the art 
of legislation, meaning that perfect laws will achieve a perfection to politics; justice is 
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merely a corrective principle to help achieve this perfection.  This suggests that flawed 
legislation simply lacks justice, but what I believe is being presented is that flawed 
legislation is a reflection of flawed justice.  The art of politics is not to create perfect 
laws, but to create perfect justice.  From perfect justice will flow perfect laws, and both 
working together will create perfection to the art of politics. 
The suggested hierarchy should thus put the internal over the external.  Medicine 
ranks over gymnastic because even the most beautiful body can fall victim to horrible 
disease, rendering the body terribly unhealthy.  Though lacking nothing in the appearance 
of perfection, an internal disease can render the body useless.  Similarly, laws may have 
the appearance of justice, possibly even providing great benefits such as wealth and 
power to the community, but appearances can be deceiving.  The only way to ensure that 
justice pervades the laws is to be a knower of justice.  It requires a complete 
understanding of the nature of justice.  This is why the greatest evil is to have a false 
opinion about justice: justice ranks the highest on importance in what is best for human 
beings. 
The question still remains as to why the business/art of the soul is politics.  If a 
complete understanding of justice is what is required to perfect the most important aspect 
of human excellence, then shouldn’t Socrates claim the business of the soul is 
philosophy?  Additionally, politics seems to be an external thing; would not it be a more 
appropriate name for the business/art of the body?  One possibility is that naming the art 
of the soul as politics may be a rhetorical function.  Shortly after finishing this illustration 
Socrates notes how he has just “done something strange”: that he just finished a long, 
extended speech when he had forbidden Polus from doing the same thing (465e).  
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Additionally, the Divided Oblong may not be a complete account of the hierarchy of the 
best condition of both body and soul and their corresponding arts, but simply a device to 
persuade.  There are several questions that suggest this framework is incomplete: do the 
businesses of both body and soul really only boil down to their two respective branches?  
Why does flattery desire to mimic the true arts?  Does it simply seek folly and pleasure 
on whim, or is there something more to it?  Where do the examples Gorgias gave of 
Pericles and Themistocles fit into politics as the art of the soul?  Surely their work to 
establish Athens as an imperial power is tied to legislation but seems more directed at the 
body? 
Though lacking in a fullness of content, and laced with rhetoric, this framework 
still represents Socrates’s thoughts and opinions.  What it takes to wrap this all together is 
further clarification on the art of politics, which will come in the Callicles section.  To 
address the false opinions of Gorgias and Polus, completing this illustration is not 
necessary, which is why after establishing this framework, Socrates changes direction.  
He has just made an important connection between rhetoric and justice and could 
continue on that point to further educate Gorgias, but instead he turns the argument back 
over to Polus, leaving justice behind and returning to flattery.  The reason flattery, and 
thus rhetoric, is no art is because it provides no reasoned account, no logos, “as to what 
sort of things they are in their nature” (465a). 
Polus, however, pays no attention to the greater lesson of the Divided Oblong, 
focusing only on rhetoric as part of flattery.  Concerned with praising rhetoric (and 
himself) Polus asks if rhetoric is simply flattery, which is more of a statement that he 
does not agree that it is as base as Socrates has made it seem.  His follow-up question 
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asks whether rhetors are esteemed as lowly flatters, which is again more of a statement 
than a question.  With Gorgias present, and the large crowd that has come to hear him, 
Polus’s understanding that the rhetor is indeed esteemed highly is obvious, and so is his 
desire to be esteemed like Gorgias. 
Socrates, recognizing that Polus is not making any progress, starts a new strategy.  
Moving away from answering whether rhetoric is noble or base he instead asserts that 
rhetors are neither esteemed nor powerful.  This takes the wind out of Polus’s sails, for 
these are the two things he desires from rhetoric.  But this tactic is successful in directing 
Polus toward the topic of justice. 
Polus’s reply is largely misunderstood.  His reply is that rhetors are powerful like 
tyrants, who kill, steal, and expel whom and what they wish (466c).  This has led to 
commentators referring to the “tyrant Polus,” or other such remarks that define his true 
desire as reigning like a tyrant (Ranasinghe 2009, 55).  This is almost the complete 
opposite of the case.  Polus has no desire to be a tyrant; he has no stomach for tyrannical 
acts, as will be shown in the course of the dialogue.  The introduction of the tyrant serves 
as a reference to esteem the power of the rhetor.  Of all the commentators on this 
dialogue Stauffer seems to understand it best as he refers to this argument as “rhetorician-
tyrant” example, emphasis on the rhetor (2006, 51).   
All the praise and admiration of the tyrant ultimately points back to the power of 
the rhetor.  Understanding this reveals the false opinion that Polus carries about justice.  
As a sign that Socrates is preparing to confront Polus’s false opinion, he again swears “by 
the dog” and asserts that even Polus does not believe the things Polus is saying (466ce).  
This dissonance derives from internal conflict with the Socratic Axiom, the 
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understanding that everyone holds to virtue as good for the soul, regardless of what we 
claim to believe.  
The medicine needed to cure Polus’s false opinion has to be a strong one to match 
his ego, so Socrates lays it on heavy here.  He overbearingly asserts himself against the 
young rhetor, demanding a refutation from him.  Perplexed, all Polus can do is insult 
Socrates, to which Socrates charges that if Polus cannot ask then he should answer.  
Perhaps a little relieved at the offer Polus gives up the reigns of questioner (467c).  Back 
in the driver’s seat, Socrates will continue to administer to Polus the bitter pill that will 
bring him to a realization of his internal conflict over justice. 
He begins with explaining why tyrants do not do what they wish.  The basic 
premise is that we all wish for what is best, and all things that we do are for the sake of 
that good (468c).  The importance here is that we do not take certain actions just to 
perform those actions, but all actions point toward some end.  Therefore, the power of the 
tyrant to kill, steal, and expel at will is irrational, for he does not do these things simply 
on whim, but for something beneficial.  And when the tyrant is mistaken about what is 
beneficial, his power to kill is no power at all. 
While it may be true that our actions point toward some ultimate good, the logic 
of the argument does not establish that following after a mistaken good leads to a lack of 
power.  This point has not gone unnoticed, but those who focus on the logical flaws miss 
the greater point that Irwin states well:  
So Socrates’s conclusion that someone who fails to do what is good for him 
thereby shows that he has no power is unjustified; Polus is still free to maintain 
that the rhetor or tyrant is powerful.  But Socrates has shown that if I do not have 
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correct beliefs about what is good for me, I lack the power to achieve my own 
good, which I want above all, and so I lack the power which is an unqualified 
good promoting my over-all welfare. (1979, 146)  
Polus realizes this to a degree, but he still is confused about his ultimate good.  This 
reveals a desire for and concordance with justice, but there is one major problem still 
confronting him: being just often means being unjustly acted upon.  Is not it then better to 
do such things, even kill unjustly, if it means a certain protection from suffering 
injustice? 
Socrates firmly responds in the negative, confirming that “doing injustice happens 
to be the greatest evil” (469b).  Understanding Polus’s thought here shows how the 
greatest evil presented as committing injustice really points back to his false opinion.  So 
Polus challenges Socrates on that point the only way he can think of, claiming that even 
the philosopher would prefer to do injustice than suffer it.  But Socrates holds his ground.   
Polus is not yet convinced, and he falls back to one of his original tenets- having power is 
doing what one wants according to his opinion.  Polus is trying to throw out that we need 
to question our opinions, for it seems obvious that everyone wants to seek their desires, 
have the power to do so, and not suffer is the course of the exercising that power (469c).  
The witness of the many here overpowers most of the progress that Polus has made in 
questioning his own opinions.  Surely so many people cannot be wrong. 
As his response, Socrates offers the allegory of the dagger.  The allegory supposes 
that Socrates came into possession of a dagger and, showing it to Polus, claimed that he 
has assumed a great, tyrannical power that will allow him to kill, beat, and otherwise 
exercise great power.  The reason that this is no great power is because a punishment is 
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sure to follow.  But the real reason Socrates offers this allegory is to get Polus to think 
about punishment and offers a way to be able to do these tyrannical things without 
punishment.  Polus, however, is disappointed when the philosopher reveals that these acts 
go unpunished when they are done justly (470c).  Polus was expecting the Archelaus 
answer, which is what he offers as his rebuttal. 
Archelaus of Macedon rose to power by committing a slew of murders of his 
family members.  Polus details many of his gruesome acts on the premise that these 
things had made him happy (471a-d).  Socrates will have none of it, for a man’s 
happiness is measured by his education and justice.  But rather than focus on happiness, 
on elaborating on why education and justice are appropriate measurements, Socrates 
instead outlines how the Archelaus answer is merely a rhetorical attack.  This is the more 
appropriate course to attack Polus’s false opinions about justice. 
There are three rhetorical techniques that Polus employs.  First, his rhetorical 
attack resorts to the witness of the many.  There are two problems with this, one being 
that even the witness of many can still be false, and the other being that the sheer number 
of the witnesses often is sufficient to persuade without hearing the other side.  Socrates 
notes this latter aspect when he states that Polus is “attempting to expel (him) from (his) 
substance and truth” (472b).  
Rather than many witnesses Socrates will provide just one, Polus himself, to 
prove his point.  This becomes Socrates’s main point to demonstrate, to set the two 
refutations side by side, that of the many against that of the one, to show which is better 
when searching for truth.  Proving the latter over the former will help Polus come to 
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understand his own stance on justice, for Socrates uses this method to answer the chief 
point between them, “how to either know or ignore who is happy and who is not” (472d).   
Second, Polus’s rhetorical attack relies on “frightening with bogeymen” (473d).  
Polus tries to back up his points by outlining the horrible consequences of being unjustly 
acted upon, including being tortured, castrated, and killed.  The truth of the matter is that 
when justice is concerned there can be no fear of these things, even if it means death 
(480d, 522e).  Socrates can state this because his few acts in politics threatened him with 
these things, including his refusal to call to vote the condemnation of the generals at the 
battle of Arginusae, as well as his refusal to recall Leon the Salaminian (474a, Apology 
32c). 
Third, Polus’s rhetorical attack relies on ad hominem.  Polus laughs at Socrates 
(473e).  Not only does this suggest that what Socrates says is comical, but it suggests that 
Polus knows why it is comical and what should be properly said in its place.  A laugh like 
this is just another way of pandering to the crowd and persuading them that you know 
something. 
All of this has a point, it is priming Polus to reveal his false opinion of justice.  
Polus states that doing injustice is aischron (shameful), but suffering injustice is kakon 
(worse).  His admission that injustice is aischron suggests that justice is the opposite of 
aischron, being kalos (noble or fine), confirming his concordance with the Socratic 
Axiom.  Polus can state this because he and every other human being considers it to be so 
(474b).  This is his only justification, he gives no other grounds how doing injustice can 
be both good and shameful other than it appears that way to the many.  Dodds clarifies 
this as he notes, “Polus said that doing wrong was less admirable, he clearly meant that it 
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was ophelimos (profitable) for the community, and from this it does not follow that it is 
less ophelimos for the agent” (1959, 249).  The young colt believes that justice is good, 
but stricken by the many examples he has witnessed of the just man suffering, he claims 
it is unprofitable, and thus shameful, twisting his whole sense of justice. 
The refutation is short and simple (474d-475d).  Something is fine on account of 
its beauty or benefit.  Conversely, something is shameful if it is the opposite of these, 
being pain and badness.  So for one thing to be more shameful than another it must 
exceed in either pain or evil.  Polus has called doing injustice more shameful than 
suffering injustice, so it must exceed in either pain or evil.  It is not more painful, so 
doing injustice is worse on account of it evilness/badness.  So more shameful also means 
worse. 
To all of this Polus finally concedes, though he does not know why.  His answers 
reveal his confusion: “It looks that way,” “It seems so, at least according to the 
argument,” “So it appears” (475de).  None is a clear exclamation of his acceptance or 
approval; all show some ambivalence.  It is clear from how the argument unfolds that 
Polus becomes less clear about his own definition, unsure of how to define his key terms.  
Archie calls this “dialectic chicanery” that undid Polus (1984, 167).  Vlastos, claiming 
Polus just needed to keep his wits about him, also accuses Socrates of a logical fallacy, 
stating the question should be to whom is injustice more painful, the agent or the observer 
(1967, 458).   
All of these are correct on their points of logic, but the logic is not the point: 
To proceed, as so many have done, to analyze Socrates’s argument as if it 
purported to be a logical proof of the preferability of suffering injustice, rather 
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than as a demonstration that Polus and everybody else already believes it to be 
preferable, is to exhibit a rather impenetrable insensitivity to Plato’s dramatic 
signals…thus his argument is designed to encourage Polus to choose justice. 
(McKim 1988, 37) 
Polus seems dimwitted because he does not truly believe the tenet he proposes and cannot 
argue accordingly.  The worse and the shameful are equivalent to him.  He proposes a 
differentiation to win the argument and gain his reputation.  Socrates is not so much 
attempting to convince him of the absolute truth that suffering injustice is not worse than 
doing injustice, as he is forcing Polus to confront his false opinion that injustice can be 
both good and bad.  The drama directly after this refutation reflects this point just made. 
 Socrates has to first drag the refutation out of Polus, admonishing him to “not 
shrink from answering, you will suffer no harm. Submit yourself in a nobly born manner 
to the argument as to a doctor” (475d).  Evoking the image of the doctor should bring to 
mind the purpose of rhetoric, recognizing that this proof is more of a non-didactic 
persuasive device to inspire belief.  This is not to say that Socrates himself does not hold 
to the argument.  He truly believes that injustice is the greatest evil.  But instead of 
reinforcing this idea after the refutation, Socrates puts the focus on the manner of 
refutation: “so you see then, Polus, that when one refutation is put beside the other, they 
don’t look like each other at all” (475e).  Polus’s faith in the refutation by the witness of 
the many is shaken.  If his desire for a good professional reputation relies on the witness 
of the many, what does this refutation signify about what Polus considers as his ultimate 
good?  With his ultimate good in question, Polus is open to refutation on his false opinion 
toward justice. 
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The rest of the Polus section is devoid of bitterness.  Polus has been refuted and 
perhaps has no more fight in him, but Socrates also becomes more generous in his 
treatment of the young man.  The concluding argument will prove the second point of 
what Polus unknowingly asked, whether it is better to suffer the just penalty.  Socrates 
asks to whom the unjust man goes in order to be cured from his illness.  The sick man 
goes to the doctor, where does the unjust man go?  Polus suggests it is to the judges 
(478a).  Socrates will work with this, but it is the wrong answer.  What Polus has failed to 
realize is that he has just suffered the just penalty.  Referring again to the Divided 
Oblong, medicine is to the body as justice is to the soul.  But is it the same saying that the 
doctor is to the body as the judge is to the soul?   
If, as Plochman and Robinson believe, the external factors of the Divided Oblong 
deserved the top hierarchical spot then Polus would be correct in stating that the judges 
cure injustice.  Justice, in this sense, simply requires interpretation and correct application 
of the law, which will correct unjust acts.  But justice as the internal factor with the prime 
point of importance on the Divided Oblong is understood in a different way.  Though 
justice does not receive an explicit definition in the dialogue, the fact that Socrates strives 
to have his participants face their false opinions that govern their souls suggests that 
justice merits a similar definition here as it does in the Republic.  Justice is an 
understanding of the correct way to act through a structuring an organization of the soul, 
through the placing of prudence over passion, virtue over vice, knowledge over opinion, 
etc.  It is thus to the philosopher, who can reveal this nature of justice, that someone with 
false opinions about the virtue needs to turn in order to suffer the just penalty, which is 
exactly what Polus has just experienced.   
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This raises a pertinent question: does knowing what the nature of justice is ensure 
being just?  Socrates had begun this question in the Gorgias section, and now the Divided 
Oblong shows that this is not the case.  The two parts of the soul art of politics are justice 
and the legislative art.  Justice has been discussed, but what is the legislative art?  Like 
justice, the legislative art does not receive a detailed explanation in the dialogue, but 
perhaps Socrates means something like this: it is the enforcement of the justice.  
Understanding justice creates a hierarchy of principles within the soul.  The legislative art 
is the actual decision making process of how to live according to that hierarchy.  It is the 
structuring and regulation of behavior in accordance with justice, guided by self-
discipline and moderation.  The knowledge of how to act and the regulation to act 
accordingly combined is the true art of politics. 
Socrates, rather than opening up this deeper line of thought (which will be saved 
for the Callicles section) instead tries to reinforce the idea of suffering the just 
punishment by stating that this can be the only good use of rhetoric: to accuse parents, 
comrades, and children of the injustice they have done to the end that they submit to the 
just penalty (480bc).  If a correct understanding of justice is already had, then there is no 
need for a self-refutation to seek justice’s true understanding through philosophical 
inquiry.  Polus admits that there is a certain logic to this statement, but it still seems 
strange to him (480d).  In other words, he is not fully convinced.  Had he realized that 
this dialectical exchange really did bring him no harm, as he feared might happen to his 
reputation, he might have realized that Socrates has something to offer.  Had he realized 
that Socrates had been playing the role of the rhetor in order to turn Polus toward self-
refutation of his false opinions he might have had an enlightening experience as to his 
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own profession.  But he realizes none of this.  Soon Callicles will jump in and attack 
where he feels Socrates played unfairly.  With Callicles on his side, Polus will feel 
courageous enough to fall back on hi false opinion (511b).  This shows how susceptible 
he is to the opinion of the many.  .  This is why Polus is no real tyrant.  He lacks the 
strength to stand alone.  He has no stomach for being so courageous. 
To summarize, Polus is a young and semi-accomplished student of Gorgias.  All 
his interactions leading up to his main role in the dialogue are to establish himself as 
equal to or greater than his teacher.  Above all, he desires to be more famous than 
Gorgias.  He is an example of what an amoralistic teaching of rhetoric offered by Gorgias 
produces, and this is perhaps the first time that Gorgias can see the effects of his 
ambivalence toward justice.  For half of the discussion Polus is simply focused on 
praising rhetoric, establishing it as a fine and good thing.  This focus puts blinders on him 
to the greater meaning of the argument, which is to open Polus to his false opinions about 
justice. 
Polus learned from his teacher a certain ambivalence toward justice, but the 
suffering of the just at the hands of the unjust leads him later to hold that justice is good, 
but doing injustice is merely shameful.  It is his desire for power (manifested as 
reputation) that causes him to leave his ambivalence for this immorality.  It may be safe 
to have an ambivalence toward justice if there are no unjust deeds that follow, but Polus 
is willing to act unjustly, to a point at least.  He may lack courage to do the things that 
would make him a powerful tyrant, but he is willing to publically discredit his teacher in 
order to make himself appear greater.   
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It is not only a lack of grit that keeps him from extreme unjust deeds, but deep 
down Polus also holds to the Socratic Axiom.  He is perhaps disappointed that justice 
does not seem powerful enough to protect the just from suffering injustice, and has 
instead found his answer in the power of rhetoric.  This leads him to become dissonant 
with himself, still wanting justice but looking to other things to fill in where he feels it 
lacks.  Socrates is successful in at least momentarily showing to Polus that rhetoric is not 
as powerful as he hopes it to be either.  The way Socrates was able to do this is similar to 
the anecdote of the rhetor and the doctor that Gorgias relayed earlier in the dialogue.  The 
true cure for Polus is for him to come to an understanding of justice and to align himself 
with its demands rather than demand from justice things on his own terms.  A philosophic 
education is necessary to come to such a reasoned account of justice and virtue.  But as a 
philosopher, Socrates is unable to persuade the sick Polus to submit to the treatment; 
instead, Socrates as rhetorician is able to at least persuade Polus to be open to the 
possibility.  But as noted, Callicles steps in and attacks Socrates anew.  For the last half 
of the discussion Polus had been alone.  He had lost the witness of the many that once 
supported him as he became Socrates’s witness.  But now someone is on his side again, 
or rather, there is someone he can side with, and he falls back to all his former opinions, 
losing any progress on his false opinions toward justice that had been made. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CALLICLES 
Few facts are known of Gorgias, fewer of Polus, and nothing of Callicles.  There 
is a question as to whether he was an actual, historical person or simply a fictional 
character.  Dodds seems persuaded that Callicles, if not a real Athenian himself, is at least 
based on a real person who more than likely was killed during the purges of the Thirty 
Tyrants (1959, 13).  Callicles is a tough opponent of philosophy, perhaps the toughest in 
the Platonic corpus.  He is tough enough to be praised by the likes of Nietzsche.  But 
though Plato put this toughness into this character, he also seems to have taken great time 
and care into him to reflect more than that.  A first reading of Callicles will show a 
confident, patriotic man attacking philosophy in the name of business and politics, the 
truly manly arts, but who then becomes so frustrated by Socrates that he shuts down 
completely.  He appears unreachable by philosophy.  A close reading, with attention to 
the drama, will reveal why he shuts down, showing that Socrates words do affect him in a 
deep manner, creating a glimmer of hope for Callicles and philosophy. 
Jaeger is one of a few in the literature to note how deep the care that Plato puts 
into Callicles is.  His first reason to assume so is to look to Plato’s biography.  Plato was 
exposed to the political life in Athens from a very early age by his noble birth and 
aristocratic education.  His family members who were politically active included 
Charicles and Critias, who both took roles in the reign of the Thirty Tyrants.    It is from 
these sources that  
Plato may have drawn upon for Callicles.  Jaeger continues:  
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He must have immersed himself deeply in their thought, to express it with such 
convincing vividness, such overwhelming force as he does through Callicles… 
Perhaps we have not given thought to the possibility that in his own character 
Plato had so much of the unruly will to power as to din, and fight, part of himself 
in Callicles. (1943, 137-138, emphasis added) 
Skemp concurs, writing, “may not this cultivated and ambitious young man who has 
lately entered public life represent Plato himself- what Plato might have been but chose 
not to be?” (1987, 29).  Perhaps these feelings are not to mirror those of family members, 
but come from Plato himself, making Callicles a semi-autobiographical character.  This I 
find very convincing.  Callicles represents the “other” side so well that it suggests such a 
deep familiarity that internal conflict about these topics could give birth to.  
Another clue that perhaps point toward an autobiographical Callicles includes 
Plato’s carefulness in putting himself in his dialogues.  He is never a speaker in the 
dialogues and is only mentioned in a few.  This makes it difficult to figure out what his 
thoughts are exactly because as all characters are part of his literary creation he is putting 
the words in everyone’s mouth.  With that said, claiming that Callicles is Plato does not 
suggest that Callicles is a complete autobiographical sketch.  Neither does it suggest that 
only Callicles out of the whole Platonic corpus represents the author’s thoughts, nor does 
it mean that any other character with a questionable historical background is meant to 
portray a personal side of the author.  But the reading of Callicles, with attention to the 
drama given him in the Gorgias, shows a careful understanding of his position, which is 
not as shallow as it appears to be. 
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Another clue is the dramatic date of the dialogue.  There are several historical 
references in the work that are conflicting, making it impossible to fix a specific date as 
to when the conversation took place, if it was an actual occurrence.  Gorgias was known 
to have visited Athens a few times, but the earliest was when he was sent as an 
ambassador from his home colony to plead for the aid of the Athenians against Syracuse 
in 427 BCE.  This date coincides with the mention of Pericles having just died, which 
occurred in 429 BCE (503c).  But then the ambiguities begin.  The climax of the Polus 
section, the history of the tyrant Archelaus, is said to be happenings of “just yesterday” 
(470d).  Archelaus rose to power in 414 BCE.  Socrates, in detailing his response to Polus 
as to not being one of his “political men” relates his experience as president of the 
Council in the trial of the generals of Arginusae, which battle took place in 405 BCE and 
the trial shortly thereafter (473e). 
So what is the point of this ambiguity of the date?  Benardete states it well when 
he states the dialogue “is of a time but not in time” (1991, 7).  Of what time is Plato 
trying to draw our attention to?  The first word of the dialogue is “war,” and indeed, the 
suggested dates span the length of the Peloponnesian war (Ranasinghe 2009, 16).  
Perhaps more importantly, the suggested dates also span Plato’s youth.  He is thought to 
be born between 429-424 BCE, making the earliest reference of Pericles’ death also a 
possible coincidence of his birth (Nails 2002, 243).  Some of the later dates end during 
the reign of the Thirty Tyrants.  It has already been noted that Plato had a strong 
connection to politics from early on, including several family members as leaders of the 
thirty.  Could the ambiguity of time be a metaphor for the development of Plato’s 
political becoming? 
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What does this mean for the dialogue if in fact Callicles is, at least in part is, Plato 
himself?  Callicles is called a hedonist, a nihilist, and other branding terms, and he speaks 
with exceptional force against philosophy that has a timeless character that rings true for 
some today; for such a character to eventually overcome these things and turn himself 
over to philosophy is a bright hope to combat the natural tendency of many to emphasize 
the problems of justice. 
The discussion with the young Athenian begins with his interjection to ascertain 
whether Socrates is serious or not.  This sarcastic and confrontational remark is met by a 
lengthy reply, noting that it is through a community of feelings shared among human 
beings that allows us to converse about things (481c).  By this Socrates is pointing back 
to the Socratic Axiom, and elaborates indirectly by showing how both he and Callicles 
are lovers. Callicles is a lover of the Athenian people, the demos, and the son of 
Pyrilampes named Demos; he is unable to contradict either one and thus turns every 
which way to please them (481e).  Socrates, whose lovers are Alcibiades and philosophy, 
only says what philosophy says and stays ever constant. 
It becomes clear  right at the beginning of their discussion that of the three 
participants Socrates knows Callicles.  This is either because he is an Athenian, or 
because Plato is writing about his own struggles with the Socratic Axiom.  Either way, it 
is right off the bat that Socrates uses the oath, “by the dog, god of the Egyptians!-
Callicles will not agree with you Callicles, but you will be dissonant your whole life” 
(482b).  The emphatic statement of his dissonance is a prelude to the intense bitterness 
that will follow. 
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Callicles then lays out his famous charge (482c-486d).  It opens as a critique of 
Socrates’s methods.  The philosopher is fond of word catching and substituting 
convention for nature and vice versa.  Polus was ashamed to hold to injustice being good 
but shameful because convention makes it shameful.  Nature has it a different way.  By 
nature the strong rule and have a right to a larger share.  The whole history of human 
beings and the animal kingdom attest to this.  But it is a rabble of slaves and other 
weaklings who join together and through convention make it shameful to practice natural 
justice.  Convention thus takes the roar out of the lions while they are young.  A 
sufficiently strong man can break these chains and spells to become the master natural 
justice demands.  Socrates would see this but he is tainted by philosophy. 
Philosophy, rather than creating a good, noble, and reputed man, instead only 
engenders inexperience.  While appropriate for a youth in order to learn articulation, 
philosophy in a grown man creates inexperience.  The philosopher loses care for the laws 
of the city, lacks the ability to associate and speak adequately both publically and 
privately, and becomes alienated to human pleasures and desires.  All in all, he falls out 
of touch with human customs and characters.  This makes philosophy ridiculous, 
unmanly, and deserving of a beating, causing the philosopher to flee the agora, where a 
man becomes distinguished, and sully himself by “whispering with three or four lads in a 
corner” (485d).   
Callicles speaks all this out of a certain charity towards Socrates.  He recognizes 
that the philosopher has a noble soul but that he does not do noble things.  He should be 
speaking in councils about justice.  He should be advising new proposals to the polis.  
Instead, following his current course will lead him to the law court where he will be 
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sentenced to death and powerless to do anything about it. The charge ends with an 
admonition to obtain a “livelihood, reputation, and many other good things” (486c).  
Socrates sees the difference between Callicles and his previous participants.  Both 
previous participants only required a narrow approach to address their specific concerns 
about justice.  Callicles’s concern is more encompassing, driving at a broader question: 
“what sort of man one ought to be and what one ought to pursue and how far” (487e).  
This is the very question that Guthrie suggests Plato faced in his life and wrote about in 
the Gorgias: whether to hold to the tenets of justice that all seem to believe, or to pay 
them no heed and seek power and reputation as earned through a political life (Guthrie 
1975, 296) 
 The Polus section was a continuous conversation, albeit indirect, with Gorgias as 
an example of what kind of student he produces.  The Callicles section will act in a 
similar function, to show Gorgias what kind of a politician he makes through his 
teaching; Dodds seems to concur with this, noting that “Gorgias’s teaching is the seed of 
which the Calliclean way of life is the poisonous fruit” (1959, 15).  But Callicles is 
unique from the previous two on his stance of justice.  Whereas the two foreigners were 
mostly ambivalent to justice, different from each only in their desire for power, Callicles 
transforms justice and gives it a new definition.  Additionally, his desire for power is 
more sincere than Polus’s.  Polus wants from power only a reputation; he wants the 
appearance of power.  Callicles seems likely to act on his power, but what he would do 
with it is difficult to understand at this point in the dialogue. 
   The discussion begins anew having Callicles be more specific about what he 
means by the stronger, since it is upon this that his view of justice rests.  Callicles agrees 
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that the stronger is the same as the superior and the mightier (488c-d).  But this simple 
definition soon shows that the many are much stronger than the one, making the 
oppression of the singular strong man just by nature as well.  Callicles responds angrily, 
as he will at most times, and accuses Socrates of more of the same, word-catching, and 
being ironical (489d).  Socrates meets his anger with a demanding reply: tell me what you 
mean by the superior!  Like his predecessors praising rhetoric before him, he can offer 
only a praise of the superior, calling the better men superior (489e).  The philosopher 
helps him along and asks whether by the better he means the intelligent, to which the 
young politician emphatically gives his support.  It is this man who is deserving of rule 
and having more.  
 Then comes an important dramatic directional by Socrates: “Stop right there” 
(490b).  He knows that Callicles is getting closer to facing his false opinion and wants to 
make sure he stays on track.  He then goes about giving many examples of how having 
more looks ridiculous, such as a shoe maker wearing exceptionally large shoes, or a tailor 
with a huge coat (490b-491a).  He is trying to get Callicles to understand what Callicles 
means by having more, and what promise justice gives, if any, as to why the superior 
deserve more.  Socrates will not relent.  He has to have Callicles voice his ideas himself 
if self-refutation is to take place. 
 Out of frustration Callicles responds, but only gives a half answer.  He 
reemphasizes that the intelligent in regard to the affairs of the city should rule, and they 
should be courageous as well (491a-b).  Socrates chides him for his inconsistency.  
Angered by the argument Callicles reasserts his definition strongly, concluding that these 
superior, intelligent, courageous do indeed deserve more.  Since Callicles answers neither 
  
54
why nor of what the superior deserve, Socrates opts for a change in tactic and asks if 
these rulers deserve more “in relation to themselves” (491d).  In other words, do they rule 
themselves?  Are they moderate?  His response is that no man “should impose a master 
on themselves” and launches into the hedonist argument by praising “luxury, 
intemperance, and freedom- this is virtue and happiness” (492b-c). 
There is an error in assuming from this argument that Callicles’s defining 
characteristic is pleasure-seeking.  This is far from the truth.  He takes up the hedonist 
argument thinking it will support what he really believes; it is not completely sincere and 
it is not the point he is trying to make.  From what we’ve seen of Callicles so far, he has 
an attachment to strength, intelligence, courage, and freedom.  This is the essential 
package of Greek manliness in fifth century Greece, and perhaps along the lines of 
Machiavelli’s’ virtu (Klosko 1984, 127).  These standards are why he does not slip into a 
nihilist argument, which is impenetrable to attack, “and in the existence of these 
standards, on which they and the ordinary man are agreed, lies the hope of a solution” 
(Adkins 1960, 240). 
Callicles wants to prove to himself that he is a man; the hedonist argument is 
simply a position he is forced into supporting because moderation does not fit his image 
of manliness.  As his reasoning goes, when the weak turned justice into a conventional 
virtue, in order to tie down the strong, so too did they conventionalize moderation, 
making it shameful for the superior, though naturally deserving, to take more than any 
other. 
 His stance on moderation may stem from a disappointment in Socratic virtue.  Per 
the axiom, all human beings have a notion of and believe in the moral goodness of virtue 
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in the soul.  But like Polus, Callicles could not but see the tendency of the just man to 
suffer injustice.  How does this suffering align with the other virtues he holds dear?  
Rather than pursuing the necessary philosophic inquiry to reconcile this disparity 
Callicles simply forfeits justice, twisting it into his perverted sense of natural justice.  
This is the easy way out, the cowardly and unmanly way out, “for to admit that one is 
concerned with virtue, and that one has a deep desire to see virtue triumph, is to open 
oneself to sorrow and anger when virtue fails or is defeated by vice” (Stauffer 2006, 117).   
 Socrates is content with Callicles’s response, seeing in it an opportunity to 
address the main concern.  He states that Callicles is finally stating what many think but 
are unwilling to say (492d).  He encourages Callicles not to slacken.  Socrates then 
proceeds with a couple of fables.  Subtly, Socrates is trying to persuade Callicles to 
change his position, but he will really offer nothing through the fables to replace his false 
opinions.  Socrates’s point will be to make Callicles’s stance on hedonism look 
ridiculous; he will be speaking rhetorically in hopes of inspiring Callicles to refute his 
own ideas. 
Relying upon a myth that uses a clever pun in original Greek, Socrates relates 
how the persuadable part or the soul is like a jar, and the unintelligent man’s jar is 
perforated (493b).  Also, in order to fill their jars, the unintelligent are forced to use a 
sieve.  Again, this myth offers nothing constructive for Callicles.  It is a mental image to 
get him to think about an order in his soul, about a hierarchy to the parts of his soul and 
which ones are persuadable.  A second myth reinforces this- the moderate man is like 
someone with several jars who had great difficulty filling them, but finally rests after 
doing so, whereas the immoderate man has leaky jars and is constantly filling them.  So 
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which life is happier?  For Callicles, happiness is in the flowing.  It is having all the 
desires and “in keeping as much as possible flowing in” (494b). 
 What Callicles really wants to show by this is the power and courage that are 
needed to produce such an inflow.  His focus is not on being pleased and satisfied.  The 
emphasis on the inflow is a stress on activity.  Callicles holds that a political life is more 
active than a philosophic life, which is why he and his friends decided to leave it behind 
(487c-d).  He takes up the hedonist argument because he thinks he is stressing these 
factors. 
 Again Socrates congratulates him on this fine definition, because it is leading 
along to the point he desires to make.  Callicles needs to fully understand what his false 
opinion is if he is ever to overcome it.  If filling desires is happiness then a man who gets 
pleasure from itching will be happy if he could itch for the rest of his life.  While the man 
with a simple itch on his head is conceded to by Callicles in order to keep the argument 
consistent, he cannot concede to the shame in admitting that the culmination of this 
example, the catamite, is a happy existence (494c-e). 
 Perhaps a little agitated about the catamite jab, Callicles puts a more intense 
scrutiny to his words.  Taking advantage of this Socrates begins a new line of questioning 
and draws careful consideration to his next tenet.  He warns Callicles to answer carefully 
after consideration: can the good and the bad exist at the same time?  Callicles gives his 
emphatic approval that they cannot.  When this proves that the good and the pleasant are 
not the same, Callicles erupts and accuses Socrates of sophism (497a).  Perhaps the 
argument would have ended here with Callicles quitting from the conversation, but 
Gorgias intercedes, making known his desire to bring the discussion to an end.   
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 Why does Gorgias intercede?  Does he see what Socrates is getting at and does he 
understand what Socrates is trying to define as rhetoric?  When Callicles asks why he 
should continue the rhetor responds that it is not Callicles’s honor at stake (497b).  What 
does he mean by this?  Is it, rather, Gorgias’s honor at stake?  Does a refutation of 
Callicles, as well as Polus (both being products of the man), really amount to a defeat of 
Gorgias?  To a degree yes, but what is interesting is that Gorgias is then encouraging his 
own defeat by desiring the conversation to continue.  Alternatively, it could be that the 
many codlings by Socrates convinced the rhetor that what is at stake is the truth of the 
argument, not verbal victory.  Either way, Socrates has intrigued Gorgias, and perhaps 
now, through the examples of Polus and Callicles, the rhetor is beginning to see the need 
for an alliance of rhetoric and dialectic.  Additionally, Gorgias admonishes Callicles to 
submit to Socrates’s refutations, urging the young Athenian to submit to the just 
punishment (497b).   
 The real point that Socrates was trying to make now comes through: the good is 
not the same as the pleasant, but more importantly, this also means that neither is the bad 
the same as the painful (497d).  This is a key point in refuting Callicles’s false opinion 
because if some painful things can be good then a just man suffering from an unjust act 
can be good.  This opens Callicles to an understanding of what good means and he is 
finally forced to admit that some pleasures are bad, though he does so under the guise of 
joking and attributing the saying to others.  Socrates catches him on this, chides him for 
his rhetoric, and forces him to take up the opinion as his own (499b-c).  Without fully 
owning up to these confessions Callicles will never be able to suffer the just penalty of 
self-refutation.   
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The fact that the good is the end goal, and not the path pursued, is reinforced.  
This had been Callicles’s belief all along.  The good is action and strength to procure that 
action, particularly political action, and hedonism simply was a way of expressing that.  
But it takes an artful man to know the good that is being sought.  This brings Socrates to 
hit on a key note that really opens up what the philosopher is driving at.  The question 
Callicles is really driving at is, as has been noted, is what way of life is best, politics or 
philosophy.  But Socrates notes that in order to answer this he needs to go back and 
distinguish between “acting in politics in this way in which you now act in politics; or 
this life in philosophy; and in what respect it can be that this life differs from that one” 
(500c).   
While it is clear that the way that Callicles currently acts in politics is differs 
dramatically from the philosophic life, a more important question to ask is if and how 
much a life practicing the true art of politics differs from a philosophic life.  Kastley 
suggests, “The confusion in which Socrates and Callicles place themselves begins by 
their false assumption that the political and philosophical lives can be isolated from each 
other. The choice that the dialogue must explore is whether one should lead a 
philosophically criticized political existence” (1991, 105).  It will be Socrates who, just a 
little later on in the dialogue, will assert that he alone practices the “true political art” 
(521d).  The true political art is not practicing politics as Callicles understands it.  A truly 
political life has more in common with a philosophic life than has been previously 
considered.  As their discussion continues, and this confluence between the two lives 
becomes clearer, Callicles will become more active in the dialogue, but will fall short of 
being courageous enough to make a change that the argument upholds. 
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 Callicles notes that he does not understand what Socrates is getting at.  Socrates 
promises to speak more clearly, but will need to reiterate much of the argument, 
establishing anew that a true art gives a reasoned account of the nature of the thing, and 
that by lacking this flattery is merely a knack (501a-c).  Callicles accedes to this only to 
move the conversation along; he does not give it as his opinion.  Socrates then lists 
several practices that fit the definition of flattery: flute playing, choruses, tragedy, and 
poetry (501d-502c).  This last practice of poetry Socrates adds in particular for Gorgias as 
a warning to the rhetor not to glory so much in his renowned style and to focus on the 
content and how it is taught, a lesson perhaps taken to heart by his witnessing the actions 
and words of Polus and Callicles.   
 But now the conversation turns back to Callicles.  These were the simple 
questions, and now Socrates will try to make clear the distinction, if any, between the 
political and philosophic life.  While the above-mentioned practices of rhetoric were 
directed to a very general audience, “both slave and free,” he now begins to ask about the 
rhetoric directed only at the free Athenian people.  Is the rhetoric addressed to them 
aimed at making citizens better or at gratifying them as children (502e-503a)?  This is 
difficult to answer, to which Callicles responds that some speak toward the best and some 
speak to gratify.  “That is enough” responds Socrates, showing that Callicles is 
proceeding in Socrates’s desired direction (503a).  It shows that perhaps Callicles wants 
to look toward more than just pandering to the demos in his political career, but has at 
heart the best interests of the polis. 
 What Socrates says next is crucial: “for if this thing too is double, one part of it 
anyway would be flattery and shameful popular speaking, and the other would be noble: 
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making preparations for the citizens’ souls to be as good as possible and fighting to say 
the best things, whether they will be more pleasant or more unpleasant to the hearers” 
(503a).   
What does he mean by “this thing” and how is it “double”?  It obviously points toward 
rhetoric, and this is the first mention of the practice having a noble aspect.   
 While the argument demonstrates a dual nature to rhetoric, Socrates can think of 
no statesman that has used this form of rhetoric.  Callicles suggests several examples 
from the past: Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles (503c).  But with virtue 
defined as making men better, Socrates cannot admit to these men accomplishing that.  
He begins an examination of this “in a calm manner” (503e).  He desires the conversation 
to be calm because he knows where the conversation is headed, which will inspire the 
most bitter part of the dialogue, for it will challenge Callicles at his core. 
 The philosopher does not come right out and state why these men were not good 
politicians.  He first builds a foundation for all craftsmen, which includes those of the 
political art, stating that their work is not random, but in order, “working to have a certain 
form” (503e).  An understanding of the form of an art requires a certain arrangement, a 
harmony with the whole.  Callicles’s answers show that he is only giving 
acknowledgment to continue the argument, making it difficult to discern how much he 
actually agrees to.  The proper order and harmony of the body is called health, and that of 
the soul is called “the lawful” and “law,” which are “justice” and “moderation” (504d).  
These things are the focus of the noble rhetor, “always directing his mind toward how he 
may get justice to come into being in the citizens’ souls and injustice to be removed, 
moderation to arise within and intemperance to be removed, the rest of virtue to arise 
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within and badness to depart” (504d-e).  Just as a doctor does not allow a sick patient to 
indulge in pleasant but harmful food and drink, so too must the artful and good rhetor 
keep the base soul from indulging in harmful desires (505b). 
 The conclusion is painful for Callicles, for it follows that punishment is thus 
better than intemperance.  It becomes clear that Socrates is trying to administer the just 
punishment to Callicles, as he had to Polus, when he states, somewhat sarcastically, “this 
man here does not abide being benefited and suffering for himself this thing that the 
arrangement is about, being punished” (505c).  Callicles has suffered enough, quits the 
argument, and suggests that Socrates complete it himself.  Socrates is not reluctant to do 
so.  He again reiterates what was stated in the beginning, that the worst evil is to have 
“falsehoods as regards the things we are talking about” (505e).  But unlike this 
admonition that was given to Gorgias in the beginning, Socrates here adds a correlation 
to being a lover of victory over these falsehoods, “for it is a common good for all that it 
becomes manifest” (506a, emphasis added).  Though not completely revealed yet, here is 
a major unveiling of the true art of politics.   
 Politics as used by Socrates until this point in the dialogue had always been used 
as a personal, individual thing.  Politics is the business of the soul, the individual soul; all 
references to the many involved rhetoric, the phantom justice.  How then does politics 
apply to the “common good,” to the many?  It must be remembered that the references to 
the many were that rhetoric could only inspire belief in, not teach, the many at one time.  
That politics is an individual thing, and that Socrates works on a one-on-one basis, does 
not negate that what he teaches is only for the few.  Rather, as noted in the Apology, he 
spent his days speaking with all manners of peoples, urging them to care more for their 
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soul than for their bodies, urging them to truly care for politics.  That he refrained from 
entering the public arena, but held these conversations privately, seems to make him 
apolitical, but as more is unveiled and the true art of politics becomes clear; it will be 
clear how political he actually was. 
 The conversation may have ended before any of this was revealed though.  
Callicles’s quitting the conversation prompts an offer from Socrates to offer to drop the 
whole thing and bid it farewell.  But Gorgias offers his last comment, expressing his 
desire to hear the remaining things, even if that means that Socrates carry on the 
conversation with himself.  Callicles, perhaps out of shame, concedes and asks that 
Socrates finish the conversation (506b-c). 
 To put the head on the argument first requires a recitation of all the points settled 
upon.  The three Stephanus pages from 506c-509c provide a succinct and direct 
reiteration of the important points established in dialogue: the pleasant and the good are 
not the same; the pleasant is done for the sake of the good; all good things are good by 
the presence of virtue; virtue is a certain art and orderliness; thus each thing’s order 
makes it good, the soul has an order which includes moderation; the moderate man does 
fitting things both toward gods and men; the fitting things toward the god is piety and 
towards man is justice; he who does just things is just; being just requires courage; acting 
well and nobly while being just, courageous, and pious will be a blessed and happy life.   
 This leads Socrates to answer Callicles’s indirect question that the best life to live 
is  “straining to direct all one’s and the city’s things toward this, that justice and 
moderation will be present for him who is to be blessed” (507d-e).  When Socrates first 
mentioned the greatest evil it was prefaced by stating the greatest good is to be “released 
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from the greatest evil” (458a).  How great is the good to release one’s self from the 
greatest evil, but how much better is it to increase that number and release others as well!  
Socrates continues, “thus must one act, not allowing desires to be intemperate and 
striving to satiate them…For such a one would be dear friend neither to another human 
being nor to god; for he would be unable to share in common, and he in whom there is no 
community would have no friendship” (507e, emphasis added).   
 This emphasis on friendship at the end is an important aspect to refuting Callicles.  
Leading up to this statement Socrates changed his mode of recognizing dissonance from 
swearing “by the dog” to using the oath “by the god of friendship” (500b-c).  Callicles 
wants a political life, but he also wants something out of the political life for himself 
personally: a reputation of manliness.  To Callicles, serving the polis is perfectly 
confluent with his desire; they are one and the same.  But as Socrates is unveiling what 
the true art of politics is, he is trying to get Callicles to consider if he is not mistaken 
about the point of politics.   
 The whole kosmos-gods, heaven, earth, and human beings-is held together by 
“community, friendship, orderliness, moderation, and justice” (508a).  These things 
follow a sort of “geometrical equality” resting upon the premise that the happy are happy 
by virtue.  Additionally, “he who is to be correctly rhetorical must therefore be just and a 
knower of just things” (508c).  If there was any ambivalence about this point in the 
Gorgias section, that the man who has learned justice is in fact just, Socrates clears it up 
here: a man must be a knower of just things and exercise his just knowledge 
appropriately.  This has been an underlying theme about rhetoric: that it is used 
inappropriately.  It is a key factor that Gorgias himself struggled with.  Socrates was not 
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ignorant about this aspect applying to Gorgias.  It was not a necessary point to drive 
home to Gorgias because of his lack of desire for power.  But for the aspiring politician, 
it is a strong point that needs to be driven home.  Rhetoric is to refute the false opinions 
of our friends and family to the end that they become just.  Moreover, rhetoric is most 
useful when the one that we attempt to persuade is ourselves.   
 Now Socrates will begin the strong arguments in attempting to persuade Callicles 
to choose the just life over what his false opinions are pulling him toward. Callicles’s so-
called “greatest dangers” (such as being beaten, robbed and killed) are petty concerns.  
Whereas it might take courage and manliness to stand up to those who would commit 
such injustices, it is real courage to stand up to the injustice we personally are tempted to 
commit.  The arguments Socrates has laid down are bound with iron and adamantine.  
Anything less is ridiculous and no fine thing (509a). 
 This statement has caused some to pause.  Stauffer notes that nowhere does 
Socrates state that these arguments are true, simply that anyone who argues against them 
becomes ridiculous (2006, 137).  There have been several logical flaws noted already.  
Does Socrates not believe in his own stance and position?  The fact that Socrates does not 
state that they are the absolute truth has two purposes.  First, it follows along with his 
professed, albeit probably ironic, ignorance (509e).  Second, it is an invitation to discuss 
these things more.  Socrates knows that he has been speaking rhetorically and that he has 
not given a fully reasoned account of what he argues.  That is one of his main purposes.  
But although he cannot call it knowledge because he does not possess a full accounting, it 
does not necessarily follow that he does not believe it (Cornford 1927, 310).  A 
dialectical conversation might be what is needed to uncover the absolute truth of these 
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things, but as the dialogue has shown this is an impossibility with the present company in 
their present condition, false opinions and everything.  Perhaps at some later point 
Callicles might reflect upon these things, discover that they are not tied down with iron 
and adamantine, and seek out Socrates to do so. 
 But more convincing than these two suggestions is to understand what Socrates 
means by “ridiculous” here.  The same word is used again in the following sentence, 
claiming that the human being who commits injustice and escapes the just punishment is 
a human being “ridiculous in truth” (509b).  What makes the person ridiculous is not so 
much the inconsistency of the logic in their argument as much as the inconsistency in 
their soul.  Unfortunately, this latter aspect is impossible to see physically and difficult to 
discern otherwise.  Again, this is the greatest evil, to have these false opinions and to 
suffer such an inconsistency of soul.  On the flip side, if this is the greatest evil, the 
greatest benefit is to be able to relieve this inconsistency.  The power to do this is the will 
to power that Callicles falsely aligns with his twisted understanding of justice, and it 
again points toward Socrates’s desire to help the community. 
 Now Socrates opens up more, and the dialogue takes a dialectical turn.  He asks if 
there is a way to avoid suffering injustice (509d).  Is it sufficient simply to not want to 
suffer it, or is there a need to prepare some kind of power?  Callicles can agree with this 
easily enough: a prepared power is necessary.  This might even have intrigued Callicles a 
bit to bring him a little more into the conversation, but it will not last long.  Socrates then 
follows up this question by asking whether a certain power or art is necessary to protect 
us from committing injustice.  Callicles is slow to answer, and when finally forced, he 
explodes and answers only to please Socrates so that he can continue.  This is not his 
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concern.  Socrates may have touched him enough to stroke his care for justice, but his 
main concern is that it still seems powerless.  There is no guarantee from injustice by 
acting justly. 
 So Socrates returns to the subject that interests the young politician.  What is the 
power to avoid suffering injustice?  Is it anything less than actually ruling in the city or 
being a comrade to the regime in power (510a)?  Callicles is more than ready to praise 
this; it is the exact opinion that his own thoughts had concluded upon and led him to a 
political life.  But in order to do this an assimilation needs to take place.  The strength of 
a friendship is correlated with the degree of likeness between the friends.  So the direct 
answer to this inquiry is that, from youth, the man who wants great power in the city in 
order to avoid suffering injustice must “accustom himself to rejoice and to be distressed 
at the same things as the master, and to make preparations so as to be as much as possible 
like that man” (510d).  In other words, he must learn to flatter.  He must disrupt any 
harmony in his soul to make it a rag-tag collection of thoughts , beliefs, and desires in 
order to appear alike to anyone in power.   
 The consequence of this is easy to see.  Protection from suffering injustice may be 
achieved, but protection from committing injustice will be diminished if not destroyed 
(510e).  Worse yet, not only will this man commit injustice, but he will also escape the 
just penalty.  Getting away with injustice only works to cement the false opinion that 
injustice is good, causing this man to fall victim to the worst degree of the greatest evil.  
Callicles, however, makes a pertinent point: this man commands great power.  Similar to 
the argument in the Polus section, the tyrant in the city does indeed have power. 
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 Socrates then offers the answer that Callicles was too cowardly to pursue 
previously, that led him to his twisted sense of justice.  If this tyrant should kill, it would 
be a base man killing a noble and good one.  The outburst that follows reveals how 
Callicles truly feels about justice and these matters; “is not this exactly the infuriating 
thing?” (511b).  Callicles is not in the pursuit of power simply; he has no desire to kill at 
whim.  Why else would he be infuriated at the suffering of the just man?  Hasn’t his 
argument promoted it, even aligned it with natural justice?  His words have, yes, but his 
words did not relay his true intent.  As has been noted, Callicles uses the examples of the 
hedonist, and now the tyrant, in order to exemplify certain characteristics: manliness, 
courage, intelligence, or in a word, the good.  Callicles believes, even desires, that the 
moral plane Socrates puts justice and these things upon is correct, but there is a big 
problem in the way that keeps him from accepting it: the just man often suffers.  There is 
no guarantee from injustice by acting justly.  It infuriates him enough that he no longer 
has the patience to think about the matter any more, and he simply throws up his hands 
and submits to a more cynical paradigm: natural justice is the rule of the stronger, and it 
is manly, courageous, and intelligent to pursue this.   
 Socrates sets about correcting him on his false opinions on all these virtues.  The 
unjust treatment of the just is not among the greatest dangers to the intelligent man 
(511b).  Intelligence was the first characteristic that Callicles firmly laid down as his 
definition for the superior, it is fitting that Socrates follow the path that has already 
established.  The intelligent man realizes that the purpose is not to life as long as possible, 
but to live well (513a).  Examples holding to long life are easily seen as ridiculous.  
Swimming is an art that can be life saving, as navigation and engineering can be.  Yet 
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these professions are not held in so high esteem as a life of politics.  What makes the 
practice of being able to speak in a law court, to the saving one’s life from execution, any 
different from practicing one of these arts?  There is a difference between these arts that 
makes politics nobler than the rest, but it is not in the ability to save lives.   
 The second aspect of the superior that Callicles praised was courage.  Perhaps 
Callicles holds to this virtue most strongly as he sees it as the gateway to all others.  It is 
courage that presents a strong sense of manliness; it is the quintessential element of a 
man of all ages.  Courage will give him the strength to take the first step to break the 
chains of convention and rise to the top of the political spectrum.  But perhaps he holds to 
it so tightly because it is what he lacks most.  Socrates confronts it face on to see if it will 
really yield what Callicles expects it to.  The philosopher begins with a warning, claiming 
that Callicles may achieve great power in the city but at the cost of what he holds most 
dear (513b).  Callicles may still have a hope that if he can just pretend to be like the 
existing regime that once he has power he can return to his desire for true justice and do 
good.  Socrates says don’t kid yourself.  The cost of obtaining such power will not be in 
merely pretending to be like the regime, but in actually becoming like them.  It will cost 
Callicles his attachment to justice and to the good.   
 Is this a condemnation of politics as a whole?  Is it really impossible to obtain 
power in a city without sacrificing justice, moderation, and the rest of virtue?  This is not 
what Socrates is suggesting; this is what Callicles thinks, this is the path that he is on.  
His considerations on how to obtain power and to hold to virtue left him abandoning 
justice and the lot.  Socrates is about to offer a way to obtain political power, though it 
will be a new concept of politics Callicles has not considered before. 
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 Callicles recognizes the truth in this statement, but he cannot bring himself fully 
to commit to what Socrates is suggesting: “In some way, I don’t know what, what you 
say seems good to me, Socrates; but I suffer the experience of the many- I am not 
altogether persuaded by you” (513c).  Socrates knows the cause of this; he has 
experienced it before in others he has talked with.  It is the love of the people, and it 
opposes Socrates.  The word love here is eros, whereas the word elsewhere used in the 
dialogue was derived from philia.  The difference between the two is important in 
understanding Plato.  It is an essential attachment in order to obtain any goodness. 
 But what exactly is the attachment that Callicles has with the demos?  He speaks 
poorly of them at the onset of his discussion with Socrates, but he also praises previous 
politicians who were good servants of them?    Ultimately it seems he cares little for 
them, as one of his last statements will reveal.  “But what do you say about human beings 
who are worth nothing?” asks Callicles (520a).  Or is Callicles in love with them because 
they promise him the political power he craves? They are the means to his end. 
 But perhaps Callicles hasn’t thought it through completely.  He feels a desire, he 
sees a personal benefit, but just like the question about whether a prepared power is 
necessary to avoid suffering injustice, is a simple desire to have political power enough to 
seek it, or is a prepared power necessary?  This is what Socrates suggests: there is a need 
for preparation, and a power that will come from that preparation.  Just as the first 
mention of politics revealed a double nature, something that looks toward pleasure and 
something that looks toward the best, so, too, is it now.  Actions for political affairs need 
to look toward what is best by nature.   
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Now supposing some political action at hand was the need to build something, 
what would be the necessary steps to have this done?  The decision to make the building 
would include finding someone who had the necessary knowledge and knowing their 
background as shown by their education and experience.  It would be thoughtless to give 
someone such a task with no proof (or condemning proof) of their stated ability (or 
inability) (514a). 
 Similarly, the same must be asked of Callicles before he enters public life, “is 
there someone who was base before-unjust, intemperate, and foolish-and has become 
noble and good because of Callicles” (515a).  This is a fair question to ask anyone who 
desires to enter politics.  He asks only to truly understand “what in the world is the way 
you think you ought to act in politics?” (515b).  To this Callicles replies, “you are a lover 
of victory” (515b).  This answer is telling, and it can mean a few things.  I do not believe 
that it is simply Callicles shutting down more.  The last time the phrase “lover of victory” 
was mentioned was in relation to being a lover of victory in revealing the falsehood of the 
virtues being discussed.  Is this an admission that Socrates has revealed the false opinion 
at the core of Callicles? 
 This should be looked at more closely.  Firstly, is it unfair to judge someone who 
wants to enter politics, but has no previous political experience, on the merits of whom 
they have made better citizens?  Presumably, this is something that can be done only in 
office, and the lack of not being in office shouldn’t count against the aspiring politician.  
But Socrates is changing the way we look at politics.  After all, it is foremost an 
individual art.  Callicles should at least have the claim that he has made himself better, 
and this is the face he puts on in trying to be courageous and manly.  But this 
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conversation with Socrates has revealed how cowardly and womanly he is, causing him 
to vocalize this admission of victory to Socrates. 
 At the same time, this is not a willful admission, and it is not a happy admission.  
Callicles is wounded by having to say it, and his tone is angry and bitter.  Socrates 
matches the anger and gives his harsh critique of the Athenian leaders Callicles had 
praised (515d-517a).  As the dialogue reaches an apex of bitterness here, it should be 
noted that the intense bitterness is not a sign of anger, but a genuine concern for the well 
being of Callicles (Michelini 1988, 57).  This attack does two things: it shows Callicles 
that even a life in politics, as much assimilated to the regime as possible, or even ruling 
the regime, does not turn out to be a guarantee against suffering injustice.  The proof 
previously given of the prepared power to avoid suffering injustice has famous historical 
contradictions, being the same leaders that Callicles looks up to. 
 Socrates is unfair in his critique of the Athenian leaders.  Or rather, he is using the 
rhetorical technique of the bogey man, much as Polus had tried to do with Socrates, by 
showing Callicles the lack of guarantee against injustice while serving politically.  
Socrates cites Pericles for making the Athenians lazy, but calls him wise and the most 
perfect rhetor in the Protagoras and the Phaedrus, respectively (Nichols, 1998, 117).  He 
mentions Cimon’s ostracism, but fails to mention his recall.   
 It all becomes clear after Callicles interjects that none of the politicians today 
have accomplished what they did.  Here it comes to light that Socrates does not blame 
them, but actually considers them skilled in their service (517b).  They were good at 
providing for the desires of the Athenians, but they were not good at leading those 
desires, ergo they were bad leaders.  It becomes clear to Socrates why Callicles argues as 
  
72
he does; there is a miscommunication between them.  Callicles does not understand the 
Divided Oblong.  As Socrates notes, “you have many times agreed and understood that 
this occupation concerned both with the body and with the soul is indeed a certain double 
one” (517e).  Previously when Socrates referred to something being double it was that it 
had an aspect that looked toward the best and an aspect that looked toward pleasure.  
That is not the case here.  The use of double refers on one side to the body and on the 
other to the soul.  This is how the Divided Oblong was introduced.  But Socrates here is 
referring to a single occupation as being double, whereas at the introduction of the 
Divided Oblong there were two distinct businesses, the unnamed business of the body 
and politics for the soul.  Could it be that the unnamed business of the body is also 
politics, making it a double art of the singular occupation being referred to here, of both 
body and soul? 
 If this is true, how does this affect the argument?  It sets the background for the 
true art of politics and it will make Callicles confront what he really wants to accomplish 
and what he wants personally out of a political life.  By purposely omitting the name of 
the body of business as politics at the beginning Socrates was able to keep Polus focused 
on how rhetoric relates to justice.  It was noted in the Polus chapter how at several 
junctions the discussion could have led to a further inquiry of justice, and hence the true 
art of politics, but Socrates held back because it was not important for Polus.  Had he 
given the double nature of politics at the beginning it would have diminished the effect 
that flattery plays as the doubling role the true arts.  Now Socrates reveals that he has 
been concealing some things, “on purpose…so that you may thoroughly understand more 
easily” (517d). 
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 Referring to the two-fold division of gymnastic and medicine in the business of 
the body, it comes to light that other arts, such as “retailer or importer or 
craftsman…baker, cook, weaver, cobbler, and leather dresser,” that are in the service of 
the body, and often confused as the “caretakers of the body” (517e).  Why these practices 
get confused for true arts refers back to the Polus section, which proved that all our 
actions are for some good.  These practices supply the body with things necessary to 
make it good, but the tendency is that the good becomes defined by the practice of 
supplying these things rather than their effect on the body.  Their activity becomes 
political in that they rank their arts of supplying to one another not in relation to the value 
supplied, but by the supplying itself.  This is not an intentional corruption of the true art 
of politics; rather, these caretakers of the body engage in political activity in good faith, 
but through ignorance misplace the focus (Kastely 1991, 103-104). 
The art of the body is political because, just like the soul, it requires 
understanding what is best and then regulating behavior to stay in accordance with that.  
But when politicians become more concerned with the supplying of the needs of the body 
than with the good that come from those supplies, the regulatory aspect also shifts from 
making the body better to perfecting the process of supplying.  Thus things like the 
regulation of commerce become the focus of politics.   
Even though during the argument Callicles agrees to the definition of politics as 
looking toward the best, he constantly falls back to this procedural politics.  When 
presented with the choice of either practicing true politics or this procedural one Callicles 
recommends the latter, urging Socrates to choose the same (521b).  The only way 
Callicles can make sense of what Socrates is saying is if the philosopher does not really 
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understand what politics is really about.  He retreats to his argument that anyone doing 
anything other than a focus on this procedural politics will suffer the worst dangers, and 
accuses Socrates of not seeing this because he “dwells out of the way” (521c). 
This accusation deserves reflection.  Is Socrates really just out of touch, unable to 
realize the impracticality or impossibility of his idealistic view of politics?  Even Socrates 
admits that there has never been a practitioner of true rhetoric, nor does he think much of 
the demos as to hope they would all be able to look toward the best instead of seek after 
pleasure and folly.  But if Socrates “dwells out of the way,” it is because he has left the 
cave and ascended the heights of philosophy (Republic VII).   
The Calliclean charge accused philosophers of being out of touch with the city.  
They know neither the laws nor the customs, and are unable to associate with others.  
While it might be easy to conjure up an image of a philosopher that meets this 
description, it portrays nothing of Socrates.  He perhaps knows the law of Athens better 
than Callicles; he participated in festivals and parties, and was constantly in the agora 
speaking with many diverse people.  Additionally, Socrates also portrays the manly 
characteristics that Callicles desires of courage, strength, and intelligence as attested to by 
Alcibiades’s speech in the Symposium (219-222).   
Socrates is fully aware of the way things “are” and the way they “really are,” 
which includes being aware of the consequences, and dangers, his lifestyle is threatened 
with.  Thus he boldly proclaims, “I put my hand to the true political art and I alone of 
men today practice politics” (521d).  What makes it the true political art is not that he 
actually improves souls of others, but by “testing them, testing their beliefs, he improves 
their souls by removing the chief source of their souls’ ugliness —their belief that they 
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are already beautiful, i.e., already know what values they should pursue” (Labarge 2005, 
32).  He fully expects to be brought to court and tried as a doctor before a jury of 
children, being prosecuted by a pastry chef.  His only defense will be, “I did all these 
things, boys, in the interest of health” (522a).  This is a simple metaphor, but not an 
inaccurate one, of his actual defense in the Apology. 
This is courage.  Socrates represents everything Callicles wants: belief in virtue 
and justice, courage to stand up for it, and a reputation of manliness and intelligence.  
True courage is not flinching from the appropriate way to act, whether it be to charge into 
battle or to flee injustice.  Still unconvinced, the last option is for Socrates to use another 
rhetorical technique, referring again to the use of bogey men, and tell a myth (though he 
considers it a reasoned account) of the afterlife and the punishment/rewards of injustice 
and justice.  A close look at the myth, however, scares away the bogey man and turns it 
into a myth of optimism in that “being good will benefit you…and justice really is the 
best” (Annas 1982, 125). 
In conclusion, Callicles cannot reconcile his wish to be just with how the just 
often suffer at the hands of the unjust.  He therefore abandons Socratic virtue to assume 
the belief of his twisted natural justice, which he believes will allow him to earn the 
reputation of manliness.  Socrates attempts to refute both Callicles’s false opinion about 
justice as well as his expectations from politics.  To gain the reputation that he desires 
will cost him what is most dear to him: his buried belief in virtue.  The true art of politics 
is to always look toward the best, encourage others to do so, and not flinch from acting 
accordingly.   
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
The interweaving of rhetoric, the greatest evil, and the true art of politics creates 
the unity of the dialogue.  The relationship between these three topics is revealed through 
a reading with careful attention paid to the drama of the dialogue.  Drama is character 
driven.  It is understanding a character: what he believes, what he desires, and why he 
acts as he does.  The most common aspects that reveal character are dramatic blanks in 
the dialogue, meaning Plato has not explicitly given direction about tone, motion, 
emphasis, or other actions that are revealing.  But there are enough clues throughout to 
provide a good idea of how the participants in the dialogue should respond.  
Rhetoric is the phantom part of politics, corresponding to justice, because it 
creates a false opinion about what is best.  It gives no reasoned account as to why 
anything is best, but mostly relies on persuasive power of pleasure and folly to mask 
having a care for this knowledge.  This is the nature of rhetoric when it is taught as a 
means to obtain power.  Undoubtedly rhetoric has an amazing power to move, motivate, 
and persuade any number of people to do or believe a number of things.  But to mistake 
this power as the good in and of itself is when error begins.   
Noble rhetoric is subservient to a true art.  The example of the rhetor and the 
doctor shows its value and utility to medicine, but perhaps its best use is in the political 
art, particularly to persuade about the true nature of justice.  It does not flatter, saying 
only the pleasing things to the audience, but “fights to say the best things, whether they 
will be more pleasant or unpleasant to the hearers” (503b).  Often this means noble 
rhetoric is refutative, aiming to persuade those with a false opinion of justice to refute 
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their own opinions by coming to a realization of their own falsity or ignorance.  This self-
refutation inspires Socratic ignorance, the knowledge of not having knowledge, which 
hopefully leads toward philosophy, which is the true cure for a false opinion. 
Having a false opinion, particularly of justice, is the greatest evil for a human 
being to suffer.  This is not to diminish the great evil in actually committing injustice, but 
it is from thoughts that actions flow.  A just punishment of a fine or a prison sentence 
may correct the damage of an injustice committed, but is no guarantee of correcting the 
damage to the soul, which is a better guarantee against future injustices.  A false opinion, 
rather than an unjust act, is the true disease and it requires the just punishment of self-
refutation. 
Toward the end of the dialogue, Socrates asks Callicles if there is some kind of 
prepared power to avoid both doing injustice and suffering injustice (509d-e).  The power 
to avoid suffering is in becoming a friend of the state, assimilating as much as possible to 
the character and nature of the regime.  This is what most people consider to be politics.  
But this power does nothing to diminish, but rather enhances, the likelihood of 
committing injustice.  What the dialogue points toward as the power to avoid committing 
injustice is the true art of politics. 
The true art of politics is two-fold: it is recognizing the nature of what is best, for 
both body and soul, and regulating behavior to abide by the precepts of the best.  Justice 
is the principle that guides what is best for the soul and medicine for the body.  Through 
the legislative art for the soul and gymnastic for the body the proper rules, regulations, 
and laws are made to align with what justice and medicine dictate, being enforced by 
self-discipline and moderation. 
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The true art of politics is an individual matter.  But this does not negate the 
importance of politics on a larger scale, for the community.  While  politics, like rhetoric, 
has an offer of power to its pursuers, those desiring this power need first to come to terms 
with what they really want from the practice of politics.  What holds human beings 
together is “community, friendship, orderliness, and justness” (508a).  This seems to be 
the same principle that justice follows to create a structure of good within the soul, 
outlining what is best.  Politics on a larger scale should thus only be entered upon when 
the things that hold human beings together are correctly ordered within the self.  The 
politician needs to offer himself as an example of someone he has made better through 
practicing the true art of politics, qualifying him to deem what is best and what laws will 
uphold that on a larger scale. 
Each of the characters in the dialogue has his own unique false opinion of justice.  
Gorgias is largely ambivalent to justice, recognizing the power of logos to create a 
relativistic, situational nature of things.  His ambivalence toward justice, however, is an 
endorsement of injustice by default, for when pressed to describe the good of rhetoric he 
is too ashamed to show that most uses are examples of injustice and resorts rather to a 
praise of the art for simply being powerful.  This makes Gorgias question his own 
indifference toward justice and appear to be convinced that a teacher of rhetoric must in 
truth be a knower of the just and unjust, as well as a doer of justice. 
Socrates’s initial desire to speak with Gorgias was two-fold.  He recognized 
something different about the man from the rest of the similar profession of sophistry, 
which was his denial to teach virtue.  As the self-refutation from the dialogue with 
Socrates takes hold, Gorgias begins to realize the error in this stance.  As Socrates sees 
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the greatest good as being released from false opinions by “straining to direct all one’s 
own and the city’s things toward this, that justice and moderation will be present,” he 
would welcome the help of Gorgias in his ability to speak to the many (507d-e).  Rhetoric 
would create a fraternity to the true art of dialectic in an effort to educate the citizens 
about the best things (Weiss 2003, 195). 
Polus interrupts to save the reputation of rhetoric.  As a student and aspiring 
professional, Polus’s reputation is tied to that of rhetoric, a reputation he will fight to 
uphold at the expense of discrediting his teacher of the value of his education and worth 
of his knowledge.  Like his teacher he has a certain ambivalence toward justice, but his 
greater desire for power and reputation amplifies his default endorsement of injustice.  
Perhaps recognizing this to a degree he tries to cover this by admitting that justice may be 
good, but injustice is merely shameful, not bad.  His own lack in believing this, and in 
part due to a lack of intelligence, causes him to be refuted, but the self-refutation is not 
fully persuasive. 
Socrates tries to show Polus that he is mistaken in the value he puts in rhetoric.  
The philosopher bests the young rhetor’s rhetorical techniques by turning Polus into his 
own witness.  This refutation was meant to show Polus that rhetoric’s power is not as 
great as he makes it out to be, and that the humiliation for a lack of reputation is not a 
harmful thing.  The refutation was a just penalty to persuade Polus to question his own 
views and investigate these things further.  The colt proves quite cowardly and instead of 
proceeding forward falls back into the protection and comfort of his false opinions as 
soon as Callicles jumps on the scene. 
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Callicles, perhaps once a student of philosophy but now an aspiring politician, 
opens with a condemning charge against Socrates.  In it, he upholds his natural view of 
justice and the classical Greek sense of manliness over philosophy.  He holds tightly to 
the traits of manliness (intelligence, courage, strength) as they seem to him the only way 
to effect any good in the polis.  Virtue otherwise is powerless to stop injustice and thus 
seems slavish.  But he wants to do good, whether he truly loves the demos or not.  His 
attachment to manliness obligates him to take up the hedonist argument simply as a 
demonstration of these characteristics rather than from a desire to please his appetites.   
Where Socrates really refutes the young politician is in his assumptions about 
politics.  Callicles is forced to confront whether his political heroes were actually good or 
not.  In service to the city they excelled in cleverness and accomplished more than any 
other statesman, but in actually leading and making the citizens better, they apparently 
failed.  Callicles should decide what is really more important: administrative service or 
actual leadership.  Additionally, he should provide proof of his ability to lead, meaning 
he should master himself before he tries to master others. 
Upon concluding the ending myth, Socrates reiterates that his participants should 
be persuaded by the arguments of the dialogue, for they alone remain standing while all 
else has been made to look ridiculous.   They are currently all in a shameful position, 
acting like youth in claiming that the greatest things, justice and the rest of virtue, all 
change and never seem the same, to which he exclaims. “to such a degree of lack of 
education have we come!” (527d-e).  So many of the problems of the Gorgias seem to 
point to just this, education.  The greatest evil is cured by a type of education: a 
realization of ignorance and an understanding of nature derived through philosophic 
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inquiry.  The true political art requires an education in justice.  Perhaps the only true 
prepared power to protect against injustice is just this: a proper education for oneself as 
well as the community. 
Leo Strauss noted that “the classical teaching cannot be immediately applicable to 
modern society, but has to be made applicable to it, that is, must be modernized or 
distorted” (1946, 333).  How is the Gorgias to be viewed through a modern lens to be 
made applicable today?  How useful can Socrates’s rhetoric be today?  Firstly, I don’t 
agree that the dialogue is meant to be a condemnation of the Socratic method.  Klosko 
calls the failure of Socrates to truly persuade any of the discussants, to force them to 
listen to a complete reasoned account of their false opinions, “the tragedy of philosophy” 
(1983, 593).  The importance of philosophy is not diminished by this fact, but the point 
remains that philosophy is not for everyone.  A Gorgianic/Socratic alliance is perhaps 
needed now more than ever. 
Bur rhetoric itself has also changed.  Hamilton in the introduction to his 
translation of the dialogue notes, “To us the ability to speak acceptably and convincingly 
in public is a relatively trivial factor in the ordinary citizen's equipment for a successful 
life; to the ambitious Athenian of the fifth and fourth centuries b.c. it was essential” 
(1960, 7).  Rhetoric today is more the stuff of reelection speeches and the bashing of 
ideologues on blog posts, Twitter feeds, and cable news networks.  The essential nature 
of rhetorical speech has lost its value for common citizens.   
Rhetoric in use today, similar to Gorgianic rhetoric, is not in line with noble 
rhetoric.  Bu the answer is not to simply add more rhetoric to the mix; it would be more 
likely to be drowned out in what already pervades multi-media.  The answer lies in the 
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ending of the dialogue: education.  For noble rhetoric to be self-refutative it needs to be 
presented in a manner where the subject will be forced to make the correct conclusion of 
his falsity.  What better way to address these issues than to partake in some of the original 
dialogues that addressed this issue.  An emphasis on classical education is the best chance 
to instill the critical thought necessary to truly answer the questions about what is best 
and grant us the path to correct our false opinions along the way. 
But if classical thought admits to only one good, one way that is best, does not 
that do more to damage public discourse by creating intolerance?  Socrates may be 
adamant in his stance on the good, but he is closed off neither to differing ideas nor 
people.  His openness was a way to ensure that none of the good escaped him.  Dialectic 
is not a tactic to debase the other side and glorify one’s own position as best, but rather it 
is “an idealized analogue of democratic debate” (Euben 1994, 222).  There is a greater 
sincerity in coming face to face with a conflicting view that may diminish and destroy 
beliefs and opinions that are held dearly and deeply than in pandering to their untested 
value in the name of toleration.  There is nothing to fear in pursuing a philosophic 
education and much to gain.  If indeed the dialogue is a piece of propaganda for the 
Academy then its persuasive point toward education has been acknowledged even today. 
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